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I.   ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the international law applicable to  
the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources that straddle the 
boundaries between States (transboundary fields) and its 
applicability to the U.S. and Mexico maritime boundary in the 
Gulf of Mexico. After a detailed examination of the different 
sources of international law including treaties, customary norms, 
judicial decisions, and bilateral practice, the Article concludes 
that the United States and Mexico have deviated in some regards 
from the standard international legal practices that other States 
have adopted to exploit transboundary hydrocarbon resources. 
The two most notable deviations are in allowing either nation  
to unilaterally exploit the shared resource, if no unitization 
agreement can be achieved, and the absence of an effective third 
party dispute settlement mechanism under some circumstances. 
Concretely, the Article analyzes how the latest instrument signed 
by these two nations for the exploitation of these resources,  
the 2012 Agreement on the Exploitation of Transboundary 
Hydrocarbon Resources, modifies international practice in several 
aspects and has the potential of complicating the efficient 
exploitation of the resources for the benefit of both nations. In 
reaching its conclusion the Article reviews the ratification 
processes of the agreement, the legal implications on the way 
both States perceive the use of these resources, and the effects 
that the 2014 reform in the energy sector in Mexico has on the 
binational treaty regime.1 
II.   INTRODUCTION 
The United States and Mexico have exploited hydrocarbon 
resources from their respective offshore areas of the Gulf of 
Mexico (GOM) for many decades. Nevertheless, this has been 
                                               
1. This Article is the result of a research project directed by the authors in their 
position as Affiliated Scholars of the Center for U.S. and Mexican Law of University of 
Houston Law Center. The authors would like to thank the Center for its invaluable 
support. Stephen Small, Marcelo Martinez, Dyan Parada, and Barrett Schitka participated 
in the research and editing of the document. Finally we would like to thank Stephen 
Zamora, Jacqueline L. Weaver, and Josefina Cortés Campos for their comments. 
Do Note Delete 6/1/15  1:50 PM 
684 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37:3 
done in a diametrically opposite way due to the legal frameworks 
surrounding the development of the hydrocarbons industry on 
both sides of the border. It would be difficult to find two bordering 
nations that have had such contrasting energy industries and 
regulatory cultures. Market diversity and global competition  
is the distinguishing feature of the U.S. model, while the 
Mexican model for more that seventy-six years rested on an 
opposing principle: the monopoly of the State-owned company 
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). These differences have generated 
dramatically different technical, commercial, and regulatory 
developments of each nation’s energy sector, making bilateral 
cooperation in energy development difficult. 
Today, with more than 3,500 currently existing structures 
and 33,000 miles of pipelines, the GOM is the world’s most 
extensively developed offshore production area.2 Until relatively 
recently, little discord existed between the two nations regarding 
the development of offshore hydrocarbon resources because all  
of the production areas were located in relatively shallow waters 
quite distant from the maritime boundaries in the remote 
deepwater areas of the GOM.3 Mexico’s monopolistic legal 
framework made it almost impossible for its national company, 
PEMEX, to develop the appropriate technology to develop these 
unconventional fields. Nevertheless, with decreasing production 
from Mexico’s easily accessible onshore and offshore hydrocarbon 
fields PEMEX has been forced to expand its exploration activities 
even if it lacks the technology necessary to exploit the deepwater 
fields. At the same time, growing demand in the United States 
for more drilling in the GOM and technological advances in 
exploration and exploitation have led to drilling further into the 
U.S. side of the GOM at depths of 1,000 feet or more below the 
                                               
2. Mark J. Kaiser, The Louisiana Artificial Reef Program, 30 MARINE POL’Y 605, 
605 (2006) (existing structures and pipeline data); ELLINA LEVINA ET AL., ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR 
ADAPTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN COASTAL ZONES: THE CASE OF THE GULF OF MEXICO 11 
(2007). 
3. Karla Urdaneta, Transboundary Petroleum Reservoirs: A Recommended Approach 
for the United States and Mexico in the Deepwaters of the Gulf of Mexico. 32 HOUS. J. INT’L 
L. 333, 334 (2010). 
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water’s surface.4 In fact, of the more than 567 million barrels of 
oil produced in the U.S. GOM in 2009, deepwater wells provided 
more than 80%.5 Between three billion and fifteen billion barrels 
of oil may be recoverable in the deepwater area of the GOM that 
is open to U.S exploitation, making it the biggest U.S. discovery 
since Prudhoe Bay in Alaska nearly forty years ago.6 
Accelerating this process has been huge new discoveries  
of hydrocarbons in the deepest waters near the U.S./Mexico 
maritime boundary coupled with technological advances that 
allow for commercial production in waters of 9,000 feet or 
deeper.7 Much of the energy industry’s interest in the deepwater 
areas of the GOM is focused on a series of recent discoveries in a 
large geologic structure known as the Lower Tertiary Wilcox 
Trend. This huge, 34,000 square mile structure lies across a 
large portion of the GOM offshore of the states of Texas and 
Louisiana and extends seaward beyond the maritime boundary 
between the United States and Mexico.8 A portion of the Lower 
Tertiary Wilcox Trend of special importance is the Perdido Fold 
Belt Region. PEMEX has estimated that the Perdido Fold Belt 
Region near the maritime boundary in the northwestern part of 
the GOM holds between 8 and 13 billion barrels of oil alone.9 In 
2012 the Mexican government announced the discovery of several 
fields in this area, as shown in the following map.10 
                                               
4. Rebecca K. Richards, Deepwater Mobile Oil Rigs in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
and the Uncertainty of Coastal State Jurisdiction, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 387, 390–91, 401 
(2011). 
5. Id. at 391. 
6. Steven Mufson, U.S. Oil Reserves Get a Big Boost, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2006), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/05/AR2006090500275.html. 
7. Richard J. McLaughlin, Hydrocarbon Development in the Ultra-Deepwater 
Boundary Region of the Gulf of Mexico: Time to Reexamine a Comprehensive U.S.—Mexico 
Cooperation Agreement, 39 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 1, 1–5 (2008). 
8. Id. at 2–3, 5 fig. 1. 
9. Dale Quinn, Mexico Opens Up Its Deepwater Oil Fields, FINANCIALIST (Mar. 14, 
2014), http://www.thefinancialist.com/mexico-opens-up-its-deepwater-oil-fields. 
10. FABIO BARBOSA, OBSERVATORIO CIUDADANO DE LA ENERGÍA A.C., PONZO TRIÓN-1: 
PRIMER DESCUBRIMIENTO EN AGUAS MEXICANAS EN LA ZONA FRONTERIZA DEL GOLFO DE 
MÉXICO [TRION-1 WELL: FIRST DISCOVERY IN MEXICAN WATERS IN THE BORDER ZONE OF 
THE GULF OF MEXICO] 2 (2012), available at http://www.energia.org.mx/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/09/PozoTrionPrimerDescubrimiento3.pdf. 
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As the above map shows, this fold belt is a series of 
northeast-southwest trending anticlines that extend south more 
than 100 miles beyond the maritime boundary.11 On the U.S. 
side of the boundary, international oil companies including 
Shell, BP, Chevron and Statoil are already producing large 
quantities of hydrocarbons and have plans to expand production 
in coming years.12 According to PEMEX, two existing U.S. oil 
fields extend south across the boundary into Mexican waters.13 
Although specific reservoirs that straddle the U.S./Mexico 
maritime boundary have not been formally identified, it is quite 
likely that such reservoirs exist and may be exploited in the 
future. 
Any developments in deep and ultra-deep waters bear 
substantial risks and require extraordinary amounts of 
investments, sophisticated legal expertise, and considerable 
time to reach commercial scale, even when the project does not 
involve transboundary deposits.14 The possibility that 
                                               
11. McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
12. Perdido Discoveries Could Double PEMEX Crude Oil Reserves, 2B1ST CONSULTING 
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.2b1stconsulting.com/perdido-discoveries-could-double-pemex-
crude-oil-reserves. 
13. Urdaneta, supra note 3, at 350 (referring to the Hammerhead-Magnanimo and 
the Trident-Alaminos fields). 
14. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF 
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transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs will be exploited in the 
near future radically changes the legal landscape and forces the 
two nations to contemplate the international legal implications 
of exploiting shared natural resources. In fact, when hydrocarbon 
reservoirs straddle the boundary between two or more sovereign 
nations a series of potentially unsettled legal issues emerge.15 
Transboundary oil and gas deposits “do not conform to property 
lines, licensing demarcations, or political boundaries.”16 In such 
circumstances, governing laws assume a seminal role. Only a 
clear, undisputed, and well-established legal framework will 
provide investors with the certainty required to undertake such 
costly and risky projects. 
After seventy-six years of state control, in 2014, Mexico 
enacted the constitutional and legislative reforms necessary to 
open its vast oil and gas reserves to foreign investment.17 These 
remarkable changes were brought about after Mexico recognized 
that it needed additional investment and technology to fully 
exploit its domestic oil and gas production and to reverse its 
decade long decline in crude oil production.18 Of special interest 
to Mexico is technical assistance and foreign investment to 
develop the deepest and most remote offshore deposits in the 
GOM. A simple look at the current blocks that are being offered 
for the bidding process in the Mexican side of the GOM 
exemplifies how unexploited deepwater reservoirs are, as shown 
in the following map.19 
                                               
THE MODERN WORLD 245–46 (2011) (discussing Shell’s Auger platform in the Gulf of 
Mexico, which towers 26 stories above the sea and from the time the leases were acquired, 
took nine years and approximately $1.2 billion to complete). 
15. Ana E. Bastida et al., Cross-Border Unitization and Joint Development 
Agreements: An International Law Perspective, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 355, 357 (2007). 
16. Albert E. Utton & Paul D. McHugh, On an Institutional Arrangement for 
Developing Oil and Gas in the Gulf of Mexico, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 717, 722 (1986). 
17. Diana Villiers Negroponte, Mexico’s Energy Reforms Become Law, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/08/14-mexico-energy-
law-negroponte. 
18. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 112TH CONG., REP. ON OIL, 
MEXICO, AND THE TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT 3 (Comm. Print 2012) (discussing how 
Mexico’s oil production peaked in 2003 at about 3.4 million barrels per day (mbd) falling 
to 2.6 mbd in 2010 due primarily to an estimated 75% decline in production from the 
offshore Cantarell field from its peak). 
19. SECRETARÍA DE ENERGÍA, SECRETARÍA DE HACIENDA Y CRÉDITO PÚBLICO,  
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In contrast, significant quantities of hydrocarbons are being 
produced on the U.S. side of the maritime boundary in a number 
of widely dispersed deepwater plays.20 For purposes of contrast, 
one only needs to see the current exploited blocks of the U.S. 
side, as shown in the following map.21 
                                               
& COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE HIDROCARBUROS, REFORMA ENERGÉTICA: RONDA 1 [ENERGY 
REFORM: ROUND 1] 13, available at http://www.energia.gob.mx/webSener/rondauno/_doc/ 
Reforma%20Energetica%20Ronda%201.pdf (showing the disparate amount of extraction 
(“extracción”) areas, which have been developed as compared to the exploration 
(“exploración”) areas, which have not been developed). 
20. See generally David Brown, Players Focus on Deepwater Alaminos  
Canyon, EXPLORER (Oct. 2013), http://www.aapg.org/Portals/0/docs/Explorer/2013/10oct/ 
10explorer13.pdf (detailing recent leases and exploration work being conducted in the 
deepwater zones of GOM). 
21. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., BOEM GULF OF MEXICO OCS REGION 
BLOCKS AND ACTIVE LEASES BY PLANNING AREA (2014), available at http://www.boem.gov/ 
Gulf-of-Mexico-Region-Lease-Map (comparing the offshore oil and gas production areas 
on the U.S. side of the maritime boundary to those on the Mexican side to show the great 
magnitude of development on the U.S. side, particularly in comparison to the Mexican 
side). 
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The Mexican and U.S. governments have expressed special 
concern over the potential production of oil and gas in the 
maritime boundary region. For quite some time, current and 
future commercial production in this region has caused unease, 
particularly in Mexico, because of the possible existence of 
hydrocarbon reservoirs that may straddle the existing maritime 
boundary between the two nations.22 The possibility that 
production on the U.S. side of the boundary may siphon oil from 
Mexico triggered a series of diplomatic negotiations beginning 
over ten years ago to address these concerns. As a result of these 
discussions, on February 20, 2012 the U.S. and Mexico took an 
important first step towards reaching a collaborative solution 
regarding shared hydrocarbon resources by signing the Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the United Mexican 
States Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the 
                                               
22. Peter Millard, Pemex Says Two U.S. Deepwater Fields May Leach Mexican Oil, 
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 26, 2007, 5:02 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/pemex-says-
two-us-deepwater-fields-may-leech-mexican-oil. 
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Gulf of Mexico (hereinafter “2012 Transboundary Agreement”).23 
The 2012 Transboundary Agreement is aimed at establishing a 
collaborative relationship between the United States and Mexico 
concerning possibly existing transboundary oil and gas reservoirs 
in the Gulf. As a result of the application of the Transboundary 
Agreement and other energy reforms in Mexico, U.S.-Mexico 
interaction over the development of offshore resources in the 
Gulf will intensify. Because neither the U.S. nor Mexico has 
been party to an international agreement to jointly develop 
hydrocarbon resources that extend across international 
boundaries, it is likely that initial efforts to engage in 
collaborative development will encounter potentially significant 
legal, institutional and regulatory gaps, conflicts, as well as 
opportunities for cooperation. 
This Article examines the international legal issues 
associated with developing transboundary hydrocarbon resources 
of the GOM. Part I explores the shifting contours of existing 
sources of international law governing offshore transboundary 
deposits, with a special emphasis on the obligations to cooperate. 
Part II examines U.S.-Mexico binational practices to manage 
transboundary resources. Part III describes and analyzes the 
landmark 2012 Transboundary Agreement and its likely impact 
moving forward. The Article concludes with an analysis of 
whether specific provisions within the Agreement, especially 
those that authorize the parties to proceed with unilateral 
exploitation of transboundary reservoirs in case a dispute arises, 
are in conformance with bilateral practice and in accordance 
with established international legal principles relating to the 
exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon resources. The 
authors suggest that a series of complications that emerge out of 
the way the Agreement was adopted could create difficulties in 
the efficient exploitation of the fields for the benefit of both 
nations. 
                                               
23. Agreement Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of 
Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 20, 2012, T.I.A.S. No. 14-718, available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/231802.pdf. 
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III.   TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBON DEVELOPMENT  
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The task of delimiting transboundary hydrocarbon deposits, 
as opposed to oil and gas reserves located within the territorial 
or maritime sovereignty of the nation, assumes great relevance, 
because they may trigger the application of two or more, 
sometimes differing, legal regimes.24 As explained below in 
Subpart B, the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon 
reserves within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is subject to 
exclusive appropriation by a coastal nation. Legally, sovereign 
rights extend to the resources of the seabed and subsoil under 
the continental shelf regime and the superjacent waters up to 200 
nautical miles in the EEZ.25 The development of transboundary 
hydrocarbon deposits, as this Article will explain, requires a 
different approach. 
Hydrocarbon deposits often lie across international 
boundaries in such a manner that allows either portion to be 
exploited, wholly or in part, from either side of the line.26 
International transboundary hydrocarbon deposits have been 
defined as the hydrocarbons “located in an area through which a 
land or territorial, fluvial, lacustrine or maritime border runs, 
separating two sovereign States or a State and a marine zone 
which is beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, namely, 
either the high seas or the international seabed area.”27 In other 
                                               
24. When this study uses the term “reserves” it is referring to those amounts of oil 
or natural gas that have been discovered and defined, typically by drilling wells or other 
exploratory measures, and which can be economically recovered. In contrast, the term 
“deposits” is intended to refer to all of the oil or natural gas contained in a formation  
or basin without regard to technical or economic recoverability. See GENE WHITNEY ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40872, U.S. FOSSIL FUEL RESOURCES: TERMINOLOGY, 
REPORTING, AND SUMMARY, at Summary (2011) (discussing the difference between 
proved reserves and undiscovered resources). 
25. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 55–57, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1883 U.N.T.S. 31363 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; David M. Ong, Joint Development of 
Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: “Mere” State Practice or Customary International 
Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 771, 777 (1999). 
26. Rainer Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers, 73 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 215, 215–16 (1979). 
27. Alberto Székely, The International Law of Submarine Transboundary 
Hydrocarbon Resources: Legal Limits to Behavior and Experiences for the Gulf of Mexico, 
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words, those resources that straddle the border between nations 
due to their physical or geological characteristics. 
Due to the nature of deep drilling operations, in all 
circumstances for the efficient development of the hydrocarbon 
reserve the operators should preserve the “unity of the deposit.”28 
This means treating the field as a single unit for the purposes of 
its exploitation. The reasoning behind the unity of the deposit 
principle is that most of the time there are few efficient points of 
extraction in the field. Only by treating the reservoir as a unit 
can the operators find the most effective point for extraction. If 
the reservoir is exploited differently the risk of inefficient 
exploitation is very high. Hydrocarbons are usually trapped in 
geological formations characterized by equilibrium of rock, gas, 
and water pressure, “and extraction from one point unavoidably 
affects conditions in the whole deposit and may result in other 
sharing parties not being able to extract the resources from their 
part of the deposit.”29 Protecting the unity of deposit through 
cooperative measures such as joint development or transboundary 
unitization agreements balances the sovereign rights of nations 
to exploit natural resources within their territory as they see  
fit with the ability to engage in the efficient extraction of 
hydrocarbon resources.30 
To understand the international legal implications associated 
with developing transboundary hydrocarbon resources in the 
maritime boundary region of the GOM, this Part will first focus 
on the relevant sources of international law. It will first review 
in Subparts B and C the international legal framework 
established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
                                               
26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 733, 736 (1986). 
28. William T. Onorato, Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum 
Deposit, INT’L & COMP. L.Q. Apr. 1968, at 85, 86 n.2. 
29. Richard J. McLaughlin, Establishing Transboundary Marine Energy Security 
and Environmental Cooperation Areas as a Method of Resolving Longstanding Political 
Disagreements and Improving Transboundary Resource Management in the Gulf of 
Mexico, 7 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 8 (2008). 
30. See discussion infra Part III.F–I (discussing the need for a transboundary 
cooperation agreement in the GOM, to efficiently produce from deepwater formations 
and how similar cooperative agreements have been entered into by other nations to 
develop oil and gas reservoirs underlying joint national boundaries). 
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Sea (UNCLOS),31 followed in Subpart D by the decisions from 
relevant international tribunals and implications of international 
customary law on the governance of shared hydrocarbon 
reservoirs. Specifically, it will analyze whether international  
law imposes on sovereign States the duty to jointly develop 
hydrocarbon reserves straddling two or more national 
territories. This will be followed in Subpart G by a discussion of 
alternative approaches to developing transboundary hydrocarbon 
reserves, including the use of cross-border agreements that force 
the parties to treat the transboundary field as a unit and joint 
development agreements that have been employed in various 
parts of the world.32 
A.   Sources of Law Governing Transboundary Deposits 
In broad terms, the development of transboundary 
hydrocarbon reserves is submitted to a “multi-layered framework 
of law,”33 comprised of: 
i)   international law—treaties, conventions and 
international custom; 
ii)   national laws and regulations of the host governments, 
and contracts between the host governments and the 
licensees, notably agreements authorizing development 
. . . ; and 
iii)   private contracts among the licensees and interested 
third parties, such as operating agreements, farmout 
and acquisition agreements, and production sales 
contracts.34 
The international legal system can be described as horizontal: 
there is no supranational authority to adopt universally binding 
legislation or to make compulsory the jurisdiction of international 
                                               
31. UNCLOS, supra note 25. 
32. See infra Part II.E (examining how unitization and joint development 
agreements are the two most commonly used types of agreements when two nations seek 
to jointly develop transboundary hydrocarbon reservoir(s) or field(s)). 
33. Jacqueline Lang Weaver & David F. Asmus, Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields 
Around the World: A Comparative Analysis of National Laws and Private Contracts,  
28 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 3, 9 (2006). 
34. Id. 
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courts and tribunals in the absence of national consent.35 It is 
essentially a decentralized, nonhierarchical system, in which 
sovereign nations create the law under which they agree to bind 
themselves by international agreements (multilateral and 
bilateral treaties) and through the acceptance of customary 
international law and general principles of law that are 
universally recognized. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) is often referred to for the 
sources of international law. These sources are: 
a) international conventions . . . ; 
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; 
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations; 
d) . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as a 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.36 
Thus, a company willing to invest in the exploration and 
exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon reserve must analyze 
a complex body of treaties, rules, regulations, and contracts in 
order to assess the risks of each venture. 
B.   Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the Obligation to Cooperate in Developing 
Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources 
A nation’s territorial sovereignty is not restricted to its land 
mass and internal waters. It also includes the adjacent maritime 
area known as the territorial sea, and extends in a more limited 
form to the continental shelf.37 UNCLOS is the most important 
multilateral treaty that recognizes and establishes the rights  
of sovereign nations to assert jurisdiction in maritime zones 
                                               
35. CONWAY W. HENDERSON, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (2010); 
PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 35  
(7th ed. 1997). 
36. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 
993. 
37. ERNEST E. SMITH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 105 (3d 
ed. 2010). 
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adjacent to their coasts, and thus is the guiding legal instrument 
for determining national authority at sea under international 
law.38 It is a comprehensive collection of 320 articles and many 
annexes, codifying legal principles relating to navigation, marine 
research, the exploitation of living and non-living natural 
resources in the sea and underlying seabed, environmental 
protection and preservation, maritime boundary delimitation 
and jurisdiction, and maritime dispute resolution.39 
The international legal principle of sovereignty confers to 
nation States “jurisdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a territory 
and the permanent population living there” and “extends to the 
mineral resources in the soil and subsoil of their land territory 
and territorial sea to an unlimited depth.”40 Historically, the 
territorial sea extended three miles from a nation’s shores.41 The 
prevailing principle underlying the three-mile territorial sea 
was the Freedom of the Seas doctrine, essentially limiting 
national rights and jurisdiction over the oceans to a narrow belt 
of sea surrounding a nation’s coastline. The remainder of the 
seas was proclaimed to be “free to all and belonging to none.”42 
In the middle part of the 20th century, a new legal 
doctrine—the Continental Shelf Doctrine—arose to address 
concerns over coastal fish stocks, the threat of pollution, and 
exploitation rights beyond the territorial sea. The doctrine was 
greatly influenced by U.S. President Harry Truman’s unilateral 
Proclamation of 1945, which stated that the United States 
regarded “the natural resources of the subsoil and the seabed of 
the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the 
                                               
38. Andrew J. Norris, The “Other” Law of the Sea, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 
2011, at 78, 78–79. See infra text accompanying note 65 (noting the number of accessions 
to UNCLOS). As discussed at notes 65–69 infra, while the United States has never 
become a States Party to UNCLOS, all of the principles of the Convention, with the 
exception of deep-seabed mining provisions, have generally been accepted by United 
States governmental authorities, and are considered by many to be evidence of rules of 
customary international law. See infra note 68. 
39. SMITH, supra note 37, at 109 n.37. 
40. Bastida et al., supra note 15, at 362–63. 
41. SMITH, supra note 37, at 106. 
42. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective, 
U.N. OCEANS & L. SEA, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_ 
historical_perspective.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
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coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States 
and subject to its jurisdiction and control.”43 Soon after, many 
other nations laid claims to their adjacent continental shelves. 
This trend led to the international community to sign, in 1958, 
the Convention on the Continental Shelf that for the first time 
defined in an international agreement the concept of the 
continental shelf and the rights of the States to exploit it.44 
Nations that did not have extensive continental shelves began to 
make claims to protect resources in addition to seabed resources, 
with some of these claims extending as far out as 200 miles.45 
Two international conferences, known as UNCLOS I and 
UNCLOS II held during the late 1950s resolved many 
contentious ocean and coastal legal issues, but failed to establish 
a uniform set of rules relating to the growing trend of nations 
claiming larger and larger portions of the ocean for their 
exclusive use.46 As tension among nations was increasing over 
the use and control of ocean space, the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in New York in 
1973 to negotiate a comprehensive global treaty.47 During the 
succeeding nine-year period, participants intensively discussed 
the issues, bargained and traded national rights and obligations 
and eventually adopted UNCLOS, which has come to be known 
as the “Constitution for the Sea.”48 
It is important to note that some sections of UNCLOS built 
on previous international agreements. Such is the case of the 
                                               
43. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303, 12303 (Oct. 1, 1945). 
44. See The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical 
Perspective, supra note 42 (offering a brief history of the term continental shelf). 
45. See Rick Noack, Denmark Stakes Its Claim in the War for the North Pole, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/ 
17/denmark-stakes-its-claim-in-the-war-for-the-north-pole (“International law establishes 
that all countries are allowed exclusive economic zones within 200 nautical miles from 
their coastlines. However, countries can also make additional claims for natural 
resources based on extended continental shelves.”). 
46. Michael A. Becker, Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation 
and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 131, 132–33 (2007) (discussing 
the shortcomings of UNCLOS, including “excessive claims over the extent of the 
territorial sea or the continental shelf”). 
47. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective, 
supra note 42. 
48. Id. 
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continental shelf, where UNCLOS took as a baseline the 
previous definition of the 1958 Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, but limited the continental shelf to a distance of 200 
nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea, and 
abandoned the rule that the continental shelf could be extended 
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits the 
exploitation of the natural resources.49 This was an effort to 
ensure that the most advanced countries did not take advantage 
of the fact that they had better and advanced exploitation 
technologies. This is why the rule as it stands today is to define 
the scope of the continental shelf as one linked to distances and 
not to the exploration or exploitation capacities of the States. 
UNCLOS establishes a series of maritime juridical zones 
that provide expansive legal authority to coastal nations in 
ocean areas near their coastlines and less legal authority as you 
move further away from the shore and into the deep ocean. 
Succinctly put, the Convention delineates four general 
overlapping maritime zones in which nations assert different 
degrees of jurisdiction, all of them departing from the baseline, 
defined in Article 5 of the Convention as the “low-water line 
along the coast.” The first maritime zone is the territorial sea, 
                                               
49. Compare Convention on the Continental Shelf art. 1, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 
U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf] (“For the purpose 
of these articles, the term ‘continental shelf’ is used as referring (a) to the seabed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the 
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; 
(b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of 
islands.”), with UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 76: 
1) The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout 
the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where 
the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that 
distance; 
2) The continental shelf of a coastal State shall not extend beyond the limits 
provided for in paragraphs 4 to 6; 
3) The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land 
mass of the coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the 
shelf, the slope and the rise. It does not include the deep ocean floor with 
its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof. 
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the twelve nautical-mile belt of sea along the coast outward from 
the baseline, in which States are entitled to exercise “complete” 
and exclusive sovereignty rights, extended to the air space over 
it as well as to its bed and subsoil.50 It is subject to other nations’ 
right to exercise innocent passage of vessels, but in all other 
regards, coastal nations have complete authority over activities 
in this zone.51 
The contiguous zone is the adjacent belt of sea of the same 
length seaward of the territorial sea.52 It is also subject to the 
right of innocent passage of vessels, and coastal nations may 
also enforce their fiscal, sanitation, customs, and immigration 
laws within the zone.53 The difference between the territorial 
sea and the contiguous zone is largely immaterial to mineral 
exploitation. 
In the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), coastal nations have 
sovereign rights to exploit and develop, conserve and manage all 
natural resources, whether living or non-living, found in the 
waters, on the ocean floor and in the subsoil of an area extending 
200 nautical miles from the low-water baseline.54 In the waters 
of the EEZ and in the airspace above, ships and aircraft have 
the same rights of free navigation that they would have in and 
above the high seas.55 
Finally, the continental shelf comprises the seabed and its 
subsoil that extend beyond the limits of its territorial sea 
“throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the 
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 
miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is 
measured, where the outer edge of the continental margin does 
                                               
50. UNCLOS, supra note 25, arts. 2–3. 
51. Id. arts. 17, 19. 
52. Id. art. 33. 
53. Id. arts. 57, 87. Compare UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 3 (“Every State has the 
right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical 
miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.”), with 
id. art. 33(2) (“The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”). 
54. Id. art. 57. 
55. Id. arts. 58, 87. 
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not extend up to that distance.”56 In cases where the continental 
margin extends further than 200 miles, nations may claim 
jurisdiction up to 350 miles from the baseline or 100 miles from 
the 2,500-metre isobaths,57 depending on certain criteria such as 
the thickness of sedimentary deposits.58 On the extended 
continental shelf, nations are entitled to exercise exclusive 
sovereign rights “for the purpose of exploring the shelf and 
exploiting its natural resources.”59 Nations must contribute a 
percentage of the revenue derived from the exploitation of 
mineral resources beyond 200 miles (extended continental shelf) 
to the International Seabed Authority.60 It should be noted that 
the three nations that surround the Gulf of Mexico have claimed 
areas as extended continental shelf and therefore will be subject 
to the extended continental shelf regime created by UNCLOS.61 
The area beyond national jurisdiction is considered the high 
seas and its petroleum and mineral resources belong to the 
“common heritage of mankind.”62 In high seas areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, the principle of freedom of navigation 
applies. 
The Convention has been widely accepted. As of January 2, 
2015, 167 countries have ratified or acceded to UNCLOS.63 The 
treaty represents a primary source of law for the States Parties, 
which are under the obligation to obey its provisions.64 A few 
                                               
56. Id. art. 76. 
57. Isobath is a contour line indicating the exact depth of the ocean floor. NORMAN 
J. HYNE, DICTIONARY OF PETROLEUM EXPLORATION, DRILLING, & PRODUCTION 269 (1991). 
58. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 76(4)–(5). 
59. Id. art. 77. 
60. Id. art. 82. 
61. See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 11–17 (describing the legal obstacles 
associated with claims to extended continental shelves, especially by nations like the 
United States that are not parties to UNCLOS). 
62. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 136. 
63. Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the 
Convention and the Related Agreements as at 3 October 2014, U.N. OCEANS & L. SEA, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (last 
updated Jan. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Chronological Lists]. 
64. Chukwuemeka Mike Okorie, Have the Modern Approaches to Unit Development 
of Straddling Petroleum Resources Extinguished the Applicability of the Primordial Law 
of Capture?, 18 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 41, 46 (2010). 
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nations, most notably, the United States, Colombia, Israel, and 
Venezuela are still not parties to the Convention.65 Nevertheless, 
UNCLOS’ terms regarding delimitation and other aspects of 
natural resource development, represents customary international 
law recognized by the United States,66 thus most of its precepts 
can be considered binding on the United States.67 Mexico has 
traditionally been a strong and active proponent of UNCLOS 
and was one of the first nations to ratify the treaty.68 In the 
same vein, Mexico and the United States are parties to the 1958 
Convention of the Continental Shelf, that, as described above, 
recognizes the rights of both countries to the exploitation of the 
resources contained in it, just as UNCLOS does but within 
different limits.69 
While UNCLOS does not explicitly regulate the regime  
of exploration and exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon 
reserves, it does provide the legal basis for coastal nations to 
                                               
65. Chronological Lists, supra note 63. 
66. According to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (“Restatement (Third)”): 
[T]he United States in effect agreed to accept the substantive provisions of 
the Convention, other than those dealing with deep-seabed mining, in 
relation to all states that do so with respect to the United States. Thus, by 
express or tacit agreement accompanied by consistent practice, the United 
States, and states generally, have accepted the substantive provisions of the 
Convention . . . as statements of customary international law binding upon 
them apart from the Convention. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. 5, intro. 
note (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. In a footnote the reporters note that 
there is disagreement concerning the customary nature of articles 64–67, article 82, 
articles 76 and 82 together, the deep seabed mining provisions of Part XI (since 
renegotiated), and the dispute settlement provisions of part XV. Id. intro. note n.6. But 
see W.T. Burke, Customary Law of the Sea: Advocacy or Disinterested Scholarship?, YALE 
J. INT’L L. 508, 510 (1989) (criticizing the Restatement (Third) for making no attempt to 
provide details of state practices to support its assertions). 
67. See id.; see also Urdaneta, supra note 3, at 369–71 (describing how the United 
States has come to treat UNCLOS as reflecting customary international law). 
68. See JORGE A. VARGAS, MEXICO AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
COMPROMISES 44 (Vaughan Lowe & Robin Churchill eds., 2011) (“Mexico’s fundamental 
purpose for enacting the FOA, as one of the first States to ratify the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, was to put in symmetry that country’s domestic legislation with the general 
rules, principles and institutions contained in the Convention.”). 
69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing limitation zones under 
UNCLOS). 
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assert claims over natural resources found in the seabed and 
subsoil of the continental shelf.70 Article 77 of UNCLOS 
regulates the exercise of the sovereign rights by nations over 
their continental shelves, and establishes a general rule that 
nations have the exclusive jurisdiction to explore and exploit 
hydrocarbon reserves located within the boundaries of their 
continental shelves. The article reads as follows: 
1) The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and 
exploiting its natural resources. 
2) The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in 
the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the 
continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no 
one may undertake these activities without the 
express consent of the coastal State. 
3) The rights of the coastal State over the continental 
shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or 
notional, or on any express proclamation. 
4) The natural resources referred to in this Part consist 
of the mineral and other non-living resources of the 
seabed and subsoil . . . .71 
Although Article 77 does not deal specifically with 
transboundary hydrocarbon reserves, it can be read to establish 
a limit on the right of a nation to exploit transboundary reservoirs 
unilaterally, without the knowledge and consent of the adjacent 
or opposing nation. First, the neighboring nation also has the 
same exclusive right to exploit such a reservoir, for it straddles 
the maritime boundary and lies in part within that nation’s 
sovereign territory. Second, due to the fugacious nature of 
petroleum, it is likely that a unilateral exploitation from one side 
of the border may drain the hydrocarbon resources from the other 
side. This could give rise to a conversion claim and, importantly 
for the purposes of the analysis, an inefficient exploitation of the 
fields affecting the rights of both nations to maximize the 
benefits that can be obtained from the development of the field. 
                                               
70. See UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 77 (noting that coastal States have control 
over the minerals and other nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil). 
71. Id. 
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Consequently, in the international arena, Article 77 of UNCLOS, 
which provides the exclusive sovereign right to explore and 
exploit natural resources of the continental shelf to each coastal 
nation, arguably represents a limitation on the so-called rule  
of capture, which would allow one nation to possibly drain 
hydrocarbons from beneath a neighboring nation’s territory.72 
UNCLOS provides authority for the notion that neighboring 
coastal nations need to cooperate in delimiting their boundaries 
as well as managing their non-living resources, although no 
definitive ruling by a court or other interpretive body has ruled 
on the precise question. Article 77 interpreted together with 
Articles 76, which defines the continental shelf, and 83(1) provide 
the basis for the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries. 
Article 83(1) mandates that nations “with opposite or adjacent 
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international 
law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable 
solution,” in delimiting their continental shelf areas.73 This has 
led to the emergence of such arrangements as unitization and 
joint development, as discussed below.74 
Several other articles in UNCLOS also support the notion 
that nations should refrain from unilaterally exploiting 
hydrocarbon resources without regard to the rights of neighboring 
                                               
72. Under the rule of capture, which was once applied in the United States and 
some other nations, ownership of natural resources coming from a common source of 
supply is recognized once it has been reduced to a party’s dominion and control. This 
right of ownership is absolute for resources like oil and gas even when the resource is 
captured after migrating across an established private or international boundary. The 
waste and unfairness associated with the rule of capture has long been recognized and it 
has generally been replaced by conservation regulations that protect the correlative 
rights of the joint owners of a common resource. See Richard J. McLaughlin, Foreign 
Access to Shared Marine Genetic Materials: Management Options for a Quasi-Fugacious 
Resource, 34 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 297, 319–20 (2003). For support for the assertion 
that the rule of capture should not be applied to offshore transboundary hydrocarbon 
resources, see Onorato, supra note 28, at 101 (“At very least [an international tribunal] 
could quite justly decide that in no case could any party in interest proceed unilaterally 
with exploitation procedures based on unrestricted capture to the prejudice of all other 
interest-holders involved.”). See also infra Part III.D (discussing alternatives to the rule 
of capture). 
73. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 83(1). 
74. See infra, Part III.E (explaining unitization and joint development agreements). 
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States. For example, Article 81 provides each coastal State with 
the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on the 
continental shelf for all purposes.75 This exclusive authority 
prevents a State from relinquishing its rights simply because it 
fails to expeditiously explore or exploit the minerals on its 
continental shelf or remains inactive after a neighboring State 
requests that it cooperate in determining the scope or contents 
of the shared deposit.76 Articles 78 and 56 (dealing respectively 
with the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone) further 
require that coastal nations exercise due regard to rights and 
duties of other nations and act in a manner compatible with the 
provisions of the Convention.77 Moreover, Article 300 requires 
that “States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations 
assumed under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, 
jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a 
manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.”78 While 
the interpretation of this language is open to conjecture, one 
may assert that nations must refrain from the unnecessary and 
arbitrary exercise of rights, jurisdiction, and freedoms, as well 
as, the misuse of powers.79 
Because the GOM qualifies as a semi-enclosed sea under 
UNCLOS Article 122,80 UNCLOS imposes additional cooperative 
                                               
75. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 81. 
76. See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 10 (referring to the power granted to coastal 
States by UNCLOS article 81). 
77. Id. 
78. See UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 300. 
79. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 1945–1986, at 
136 (1989) (proposing that the concept of good faith was incorporated and codified in the 
law of treaties); see also Richard J. McLaughlin, Settling Trade-Related Disputes Over 
the Protection of Marine Living Resources: UNCLOS or the WTO?, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. REV. 29, 63, 66 (1997) (noting that although it is unclear how good faith will be 
interpreted in the context of UNCLOS, the principles of good faith and abuse of right are 
well established in international law and have the respective meanings of remaining 
faithful to the intentions of the parties and misusing power such that a party evades its 
contractual obligations); Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of the United 
States’ Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other 
International Marine Living Resources, ECOLOGY L.Q., no. 1, 1994, at 1, 57 (noting that 
it is unclear how UNCLOS article 300, dealing with good faith, and article 301, dealing 
with peacefulness of the seas, will be interpreted). 
80. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 122 (defining “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” to 
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measures on bordering states. Article 123 provides that “States 
bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-operate 
with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the 
performance of their duties.”81 This Article refers specifically to 
an obligation to cooperate in the conservation of marine living 
resources, protection of the marine environment, and coordination 
of marine scientific research and does not make specific reference 
to development of hydrocarbons.82 However, some experts have 
interpreted Article 123 as requiring nations sharing a semi-
enclosed sea with an interest in common resources, including 
hydrocarbons, to negotiate in good faith with a view to concluding 
an agreement when their interests collide.83 Finally, Articles 
74(3) and 83(3), dealing respectively with exclusive economic 
zone and continental shelf delimitations, call on coastal nations 
to act “in a spirit of understanding and cooperation” and to make 
every effort to enter into provisional arrangements “of a practical 
nature” prior to reaching formal delimitation agreements.84 
Because Articles 74 and 83 only apply when a boundary has not 
yet been delimited, these provisions have limited application  
to the transboundary resources straddling the treaty-based 
maritime boundaries between the United States and Mexico in 
the GOM. Nevertheless, all of the described provisions taken 
together clearly show that the spirit and purposes of UNCLOS 
are enhanced by encouraging cooperation in the development of 
straddling deposits. 
                                               
mean[s] a gulf, basin, or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another 
sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial 
seas or exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States”). 
81. Id. art. 123. 
82. Id. 
83. See, e.g., Rainer Lagoni, Commentary, The Baltic Sea, in LAW OF THE SEA IN 
THE 1980S: PROCEEDINGS 517, 519 (Choon-ho Park ed., 1983). 
84. UNCLOS, supra note 25, arts. 74(3), 83(3). The complete text of article 83(3) is 
the following: 
Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a 
spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional 
period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such 
arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation. 
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UNCLOS clearly establishes an obligation to cooperate in 
reaching agreement on the exploration and exploitation of 
transboundary deposits pending delimitation of the maritime 
boundary between the adjacent or opposing States. 85 However, it 
is less clear whether UNCLOS requires nations to cooperate in 
the exploration or exploitation of a transboundary hydrocarbon 
reserve where there is already a delimited maritime boundary 
established between them, as is the case involving United States 
and Mexican rights in the Gulf of Mexico. In other words, 
whether States are required to unitize or jointly develop such 
reservoirs. To answer this question it is imperative to analyze 
secondary sources of international law, to which we now turn. 
C.   International Customary Law, Judicial Decisions and Expert 
Opinions 
International Customary Law is a secondary source of 
international law, which can be briefly defined as a general 
practice accepted as law.86 It derives its force from two essential 
elements: the concurrence of uniform State practice and a 
“psychological” belief that adherence to these rules is obligatory 
and made with “a sense of legal obligation” (opinio juris).87 
Evidence of the subjective element, opinio juris, can be found in 
the enactment of domestic legislation; the declarations of official 
State representatives; the principles agreed by states in their 
conduct of their international relations; and in the writings of 
learned international lawyers and in judicial decisions of national 
and international courts; and in the adoption of resolutions of 
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that reflect the 
views of the majority of member States.88 
                                               
85. See Ong, supra note 25, at 802 (noting that the obligation to cooperate in 
reaching agreement on the exploration and exploitation of common deposits is a cardinal 
rule of customary international law). 
86. See HENDERSON, supra note 35, at 58 (explaining that although customary 
laws are not written rules like treaties, States tend to accept the customs developed in 
international law). 
87. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL Law 46 (4th ed. 2003) 
(explaining the elements necessary for the formation of customary international law). 
88. Bastida et al., supra note 15, at 361–62. 
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The ICJ in the Asylum Case recognized that in some 
circumstances a customary norm may arise between certain 
States in a particular geographical area or region without 
necessarily being accepted by the rest of the world as such.89 
According to some commentators, a regional customary norm 
must meet two special requirements before becoming recognized 
as international customary law: 
(i) it has to be tacitly accepted by all the parties 
concerned (thereby boiling down to a sort of tacit 
agreement, as has been rightly noted by some 
commentators); [and] (ii) its existence must be proved 
by the State that invokes it, with the consequence that 
if this State fails to discharge its burden of proof, the 
claim based on the alleged customary rule is rejected.90 
In the Right of Passage over Indian Territory, the World 
Court recognized that a local custom may arise and be binding 
only upon two States. In the words of the Court: 
It is difficult to see why the number of States between 
which a local custom may be established on the basis of 
long practice must necessarily be larger than two. The 
Court sees no reason why long continued practice 
between two States accepted by them as regulating 
their relations should not form the basis of mutual 
rights and obligations between the two States.91 
Whether there is an international legal obligation to 
cooperate in the development of transboundary hydrocarbon 
resources when there is an established maritime boundary is  
an unsettled question. For example, the International Law 
Commission decided to include the topic “Shared natural 
resources” in its program of work to address transboundary oil 
and natural gas, based on the general principle of cooperation 
                                               
89. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276 (Nov. 20) (“The Party which 
relies on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom [regional] is established in such 
a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The Colombian Government must 
prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage 
practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the expression of a right 
appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial 
State.”). 
90. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 164 (2d ed. 2005). 
91. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6, 39 (Apr. 12). 
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(on the basis of equality of right, equity, and mutual benefit in 
the exploitation of “common resources”).92 However, the majority 
of member States expressed the view that the Commission 
should not develop the subject further, for the issue involved the 
“essential bilateral interests” of the States and any attempt to 
codify general rules would not be “appropriate or necessary.”93 
These States felt that any attempt to develop general principles 
that may affect the sovereign prerogatives and large economic 
interests associated with transboundary offshore hydrocarbons 
would generate intense controversy. Thus, the Commission 
decided that the topic of oil and gas would not be pursued at that 
time.94 
Despite this note of reluctance by members of the 
International Law Commission, many scholars accept the trend 
that international customary law requires nations to consult 
and to work towards some sort of cooperative arrangement  
to develop transboundary hydrocarbon resources.95 While the 
precise parameters of that cooperation are still not settled, there 
is unanimity among commentators that customary law prohibits 
one sharing nation from unilaterally exploiting a shared resource 
to the detriment of the co-owning nation.96 This obligation has 
                                               
92. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 62d Sess., U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, 62d Sess., 
May 3–June 4, July 6–Aug. 6, 2010, ch. XII pt. A, U.N. Doc. A/65/10 (2010). 
93. U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, 62d Sess., May 3–June 4 & July 6–Aug. 6, 2010, § 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/621 (2010). 
94. See Rep. of U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 92 (citing the opposing views of 
States as a reason for not considering oil and gas at that time). 
95. McLaughlin, supra note 72, at 320–21 (explaining why some form of joint 
exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits is progressively moving toward 
customary legal status); Ong, supra note 25, at 792 (“[A] rule of customary international 
law requiring cooperation specifically with the view toward joint development or 
transboundary unitization of a common hydrocarbon deposit has not yet crystallized.”); 
William T. Onorato, Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit, 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q., Apr. 1977, at 324, 333 (recommending unitization as “clearly the 
best and, accordingly, the prime objective to aim for”); see also Masahiro Miyoshi, The 
Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 
MAR. BRIEFING, no. 5, 199, at 1, 7–37 (providing more than a dozen examples of nations 
that co-own transboundary hydrocarbon resources developing joint development or 
unitization agreements). 
96. See Lagoni, supra note 26, at 235 (explaining that although there is no 
conventional obligation in place, customary law prohibits states from exploiting shared 
resources); see also Miyoshi, supra note 95, at 5 (noting that joint development schemes 
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even been interpreted by some commentators as prohibiting any 
form of unilateral exploitation if an offer for joint development 
or unitization is refused by the sharing State.97 However, the 
notion that one nation may possess virtual veto authority over 
the exploitation of natural resources within the sovereign 
territory of another nation is unrealistic and runs counter to the 
well-established right to territorial integrity.98 Instead, a more 
realistic and reasonable approach has been advocated by 
University of Dundee Professor Peter Cameron, which would 
allow one party to go ahead and commence development in 
response to protracted difficulties in negotiations with a sharing 
nation as long as it fully incorporates the principle of unity of 
deposit and good petroleum industry practice.99 According to 
Cameron, this option would include the following four elements: 
a) The potential interests of the other State could be 
taken into account by making a preliminary estimate 
of the percentage of the field that may extend into the 
                                               
arise in situations where states cannot agree on boundaries or where boundaries are 
delimited, followed by several examples of differing joint development schemes); 
Onorato, supra note 28, at 101 (noting that although there is no developed international 
law, custom and practice indicate that there are rules that require cooperative 
development of international petroleum deposits and prohibit unilateral exploitation). 
97. See Onorato, supra note 28, at 329 (“Accordingly, it has been concluded that a 
State or States interested in an international common petroleum deposit may not exploit 
such a deposit over the seasonable objection of another such State or States and, 
therefore, such unlawful action, if taken, would be enjoinable and/or answerable in 
damages.”). However, this would not preclude the nations from explicitly agreeing to a 
different arrangement regarding the exploitation of the resources. See infra Part III 
(discussing the U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement which prohibits 
unilateral abuse of resources). 
98. See Urdaneta, supra note 3, at 377 (rejecting the “exercise of mutual restraint” 
argument which claims that one state has veto power over another and arguing instead 
that each state’s sovereignty and right to territorial integrity will preclude one state 
from imposing unilateral restrictions over another); Peter D. Cameron, The Rules of 
Engagement: Developing Cross-Border Petroleum Deposits in the North Sea and the 
Caribbean, INT’L & COMP. L.Q., July 2006, at 559, 562 (noting that because the principle 
of sovereignty does not easily co-exist with the duty to cooperate and jointly manage 
resources, there are limitations placed on the duty to cooperate). 
99. Cameron, supra note 98, at 583. Cameron’s proposed option leaves unanswered 
the issue of how one nation can place wells in the optimal position to maximize the 
ultimate recovery of production if only one nation is producing. Although his approach 
does address the issue of equity, depending on the circumstances, it may not represent 
the most efficient method of well spacing, which may hurt both nations. 
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other State’s territory and establishing an escrow 
account to deposit a portion of net revenues for the 
other State’s benefit . . . ; 
b) the initiating State should continue in good faith and 
with diligence to inform and consult with the other 
State with respect to its petroleum operations and 
with a view to reaching agreement as required under 
the delimitation agreement; 
c) the initiating State would maintain and make 
available to the other State for inspection complete 
and accurate records of all costs and revenues 
pertaining to the field’s development and production; 
and 
d) once a preliminary agreement is reached, activities 
and apportionment of costs should be adjusted 
accordingly; the funds in the escrow account could be 
released to the other State . . . .100 
We endorse the approach taken by Professor Cameron. 
Moving forward in this reasonable and responsible manner 
should satisfy existing international legal norms by rejecting a 
rule of capture approach and instead applying, in good faith, the 
principle of the unity of deposit in line with sound international 
petroleum industry practices.101 Furthermore, by using the best 
practices available to the industry and treating the field as a unit 
the unilateral exploitation could achieve high levels of efficiency, 
as long as the operator can prove that its drilling site is located 
in the most effective point of the reservoir. 
The approach advocated by Professor Cameron, however, 
may not be unanimously accepted. It is still too early in the 
progressive development of international customary law on this 
topic to definitively assert that there is or is not an affirmative 
duty to jointly develop transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs. 
Furthermore, without having access to both sides of the 
borderline it is hard to determine where the most effective 
drilling point of the field is located, opening the possibility that 
the exploitation may be carried out in an inefficient way that 
                                               
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 583–85; see also Miyoshi, supra note 95, at 5 (describing how setting up 
an escrow account to compensate a co-owning nation may be a possible approach). 
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unnecessarily depletes natural resources. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of a binational practice that can become a customary 
norm between two States is always possible, especially when it 
comes to treating similar resources in a joint way respecting 
both side’s rights and seeking to exploit them in the most 
efficient manner. 
The progressive development of customary law calling on 
nations to jointly develop shared natural resources is further 
supported by many United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions. For instance, Resolution 3129 on “co-operation in the 
field of the environment concerning natural resources shared by 
two or more States,” supported by Article 3 of the 1974 Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, calls for “adequate 
international standards for the conservation and harmonious 
exploitation of natural resources common to two or more states,” 
with such cooperation being developed “on the basis of a system 
of information and prior consultation.”102 In addition, general 
principles of international law such as the principle of good 
neighborliness enshrined in Article 74 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, which places an obligation on States to refrain 
from activities that potentially could cause damage to the 
legitimate rights and interests of other States,103 supports the 
principle to cooperate in the development of transboundary 
reservoirs.104 Finally, the United Nations Environmental 
Program (UNEP) stresses in its principles of conduct the need for 
cooperation in the conservation and harmonious utilization of 
natural resources shared by two or more States.105 
                                               
102. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), art. 
3, U.N. Doc. A/Res/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974). 
103. U.N. Charter art. 74 (defining the concept of good-neighborliness as each 
nation taking account for the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, 
economic, and commercial matters). 
104. See Gao Zhiguo, Legal Aspects of Joint Development in International Law, in 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND PRESERVATION OF THE OCEANS: THE CHALLENGES OF 
UNCLOS AND AGENDA 21, at 634 (Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja et al. eds., 1995) (listing 
customary international law, along with the principles of good neighborliness and 
cooperation as strong support for joint exploitation). 
105. See McLaughlin, supra note 72, at 313 (noting that UNEP developed a set of 
fifteen draft principles, the first of which calling for cooperation among states). These 
UNEP draft principles are intended to guide not just hydrocarbon development, but 
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The ICJ has also placed an emphasis on collaborative 
processes by consistently pointing out principles of cooperation 
and consultation in deciding delimitation of continental shelf 
cases. These principles can be summarized as follows: first, 
unilateral exploitation of the deposit in disputed areas  
is prohibited; second, methods of efficient exploitation and 
apportionment of such a deposit must be agreed between the 
parties involved; and third, all parties concerned are required to 
negotiate in good faith in order to arrive at a provisional 
arrangement.106 The Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
Case recognized the importance of the unity of the resources and 
of their efficient exploitation: 
Another factor to be taken into consideration in the 
delimitation of areas of continental shelf as between 
adjacent States is the unity of any deposits. The natural 
resources of the subsoil of the sea in those parts which 
consist of continental shelf are the very object of the 
legal régime established subsequent to the Truman 
Proclamation. Yet it frequently occurs that the same 
deposit lies on both sides of the line dividing a 
continental shelf between two States, and since it is 
possible to exploit such a deposit from either side, a 
problem immediately arises on account of the risk of 
prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or other of 
the States concerned. To look no farther than the North 
Sea, the practice of States shows how this problem has 
been dealt with, and all that is needed is to refer to  
the undertakings entered into by the coastal States of  
that sea with a view to ensuring the most efficient 
exploitation or the apportionment of the products 
extracted . . . . The Court does not consider that unity of 
deposit constitutes anything more than a factual element 
which it is reasonable to take into consideration in the 
course of the negotiations for a delimitation.107 
                                               
exploitation of other natural resources shared by two or more nations. The U.N. General 
Assembly failed to adopt the UNEP-created principles due to objections by some States 
that the proposed principles encroached upon their sovereignty to manage natural 
resources under their control. Id. 
106. Onorato, supra note 28, at 89–92. 
107. N. Sea Continental Shelf ( F.R.G./Den; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 97 (Feb. 
20). 
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From the above statement of the ICJ we can conclude that 
the World Court recognized some of the principles that have 
been analyzed by this study as guiding the exploitation of 
transboundary resources. First, the ICJ is recognizing that the 
unitization of the transboundary fields helps to ensure that the 
exploitation of those resources is done in an efficient way without 
placing in danger the rights of each State; second, it recognized 
that it is an international practice of the States to include such  
a principle of unitization in their treaties dealing with such 
resources; thirdly, although it does not recognize that unitization 
or the creation of a joint exploitation zone is an international 
customary norm, it does recognize that it is a pragmatic solution 
to solve delimitation problems, something that is precisely 
contemplated in Article 83(3) of UNCLOS. 
Importantly, the ICJ emphasized that the customary norm in 
play when the boundary line is in dispute is to negotiate in good 
faith respecting the principles of proportionality and equity, but 
once the borderline is found and negotiated, the Court does 
recognize that if there are resources in the area that need to be 
preserved as a unit for their development then a joint exploitation 
regime is the most appropriate: 
In a sea with the particular configuration of the North 
Sea, and in view of the particular geographical situation 
of the Parties’ coastlines upon that sea, the methods 
chosen by them for the purpose of fixing the delimitation 
of their respective areas may happen in certain localities 
to lead to an overlapping of the areas appertaining to 
them. The Court considers that such a situation must be 
accepted as a given fact and resolved either by an agreed, 
or failing that by an equal division of the overlapping 
areas, or by agreements for joint exploitation, the latter 
solution appearing particularly appropriate when it is a 
question of preserving the unity of a deposit.108 
The above statement by the Court respects the nature of 
hydrocarbon deposits, since the drilling on a particular area  
of the field might be insufficient for the exploitation of the 
reservoir. The fact that the field is treated as a unit for the sake 
of its exploitation is the only way to ensure that it is being 
                                               
108. Id. ¶ 99. 
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exploited efficiently. A boundary line that cuts across the field, 
might be a source to determine the jurisdiction and the 
percentage belonging to each State, but the most efficient point 
for drilling is not determined by a fictitious line but by natural 
characteristics of the reservoir. Consequently, the only way in 
which the rights of both States and where both can maximize 
the benefit of the field, is to treat it as a unit and exploit it 
jointly with the most efficient contractual framework available 
to the States. Some members of the Court recognized that  
the delimitation of the border had deeper implications when 
hydrocarbons were involved due the equity and proportionality 
principles. In fact, Judge Philip Jessup even argued in the North 
Sea Case that what was behind the litigation, was not the 
definition of the boundary itself, but the existence of 
hydrocarbon resources in the areas and that the States in their 
memorial were trying to find the most “appropriate” method of 
exploitation “in order to avoid wasteful or harmful methods of 
extraction which would lead to despoliation.”109 He pointed out 
the following: 
 It is apparent from the above extracts that the 
problem of the exploitation of the oil and gas resources 
of the continental shelf of the North Sea was in the 
front of the minds of the Parties but that none of them 
was prepared to base its case squarely on consideration 
of this factor, preferring to argue on other legal 
principles which are sometimes advanced with almost 
academic detachment from realities.110 
. . . . 
. . . Therefore, while, as the Court States, the principle 
of joint exploitation is particularly appropriate in cases 
involving the principle of the unity of a deposit, it may 
have a wider application in agreements reached by the 
Parties concerning the still undelimited but potentially 
overlapping areas of the continental shelf which have 
been in dispute. 
 Nor is it irrelevant to recall that the principle of 
international cooperation in the exploitation of a 
                                               
109. Id. at 68 (Jessup, J., concurring). 
110. Id. at 72. 
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natural resource is well established in other 
international practice. The Federal Republic invoked 
the Helsinki Rules of the International Law Association 
concerning the sharing of the waters of a river basin 
traversing or bordering more than one State. Whether 
or not those Rules are the most accurate statement of 
the existing international law, as to which I express no 
opinion, there are numerous examples of co-operative 
use and of sharing of fluvial resources. 
. . . . 
 Clearly, the principle of co-operation applied to the 
stage of exploration as well as to that of exploitation, 
and there is nothing to prevent the Parties in their 
negotiations, pending final delimitations, from agreeing 
upon, for example, joint licensing of a consortium 
which, under appropriate safeguards concerning future 
exploitation, might undertake the requisite wildcat 
operations.111 
                                               
111. Id. at 82–83. Judge Jessup even gave a broad description of all the joint 
exploitation agreements, both of delimited and of disputes borderlines, as a sign of 
international practice on the matter: 
 Of the existing North Sea agreements relating to joint exploitation and 
mentioned in paragraph 97 of the Judgment of the Court, that between the 
Netherlands and the Federal Republic applying to the Ems Estuary is, as 
already noted, the most complete example of full cooperation in both 
exploitation and profit-sharing. The Agreement of 6 October 1965 between 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom calls for consultation on the most 
effective exploitation of overlapping deposits and on “the manner in which 
the costs and proceeds relating thereto shall be apportioned”. If the two 
Governments fail to reach agreement, the matter is to be referred, at the 
request of either one, to an arbitrator whose decision is binding. If licensees 
are involved, their proposals are to be considered by the Governments. The 
other agreements in general call for consultation with a view to agreement; 
in the United Kingdom-Norway Agreement of 10 March 1965 there is again 
provision for consulting any licensees. 
 Outside the North Sea, the problem of a deposit extending across a 
boundary line is dealt with in a similar manner in the Agreement between 
Italy and Yugoslavia of 8 January 1968 concerning the delimitation of their 
respective areas of the intervening continental shelf in the Adriatic. In the 
Persian Gulf, there are examples of agreements for shared exploitation and 
shared profits at least in the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Agreement of 7 July 1965, 
and the Bahrein-Saudi Arabia Agreement of 22 February 1958. An equal 
division of recoverable oil seems to have been provided for in a recently 
initialed agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia which was mentioned by 
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In sum, Judge Jessup was more explicit than the majority 
opinion in the case, and analyzed an existing practice of 
negotiating agreements when the existence of shared resources 
was present, and in such a practice joint exploitation was a 
corollary of the principles of cooperation and respect of each 
others right in trying to achieve an effective exploitation. Judge 
Bustamante of the ICJ in the North Sea Case concurred with 
this view and argued that one of the emerging principles 
regarding the exploitation of resources in the continental shelf is 
that: 
The exploitation of a deposit extending across the 
boundary line of a continental shelf shall be settled by 
the adjacent States in accordance with the principles of 
equity and, preferably, by means of the system of joint 
exploitation or some other system which does not 
reduce the efficiency of working or the quantities 
obtained.112 
In the opinion of Judge Jessup, the efficient exploitation of 
these types of resources emerges as a guiding principle behind 
the regime. Years later another judge of the World Court 
reaffirmed Judge Jessup’s views in a case involving Libya and 
Tunisia.113 In his dissenting opinion in the Continental Shelf 
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) Case, Judge Jens Evensen, 
an expert in maritime law and a former member of the Jan 
Mayen commission that delimited the continental shelf of Iceland 
and Norway in 1981,114 stated: 
                                               
both sides in the oral proceedings. 
 Most of the North Sea agreements, and the agreement in the Adriatic, 
specifically relate to a deposit which extends across a boundary line, but the 
German-Dutch Agreement on the Ems Estuary and agreements in the Persian 
Gulf provide for joint exploitation or profit-sharing in areas of considerable 
extent where the national boundaries are undetermined or had been recently 
agreed upon subject to the provision for joint interests, as particularly in the 
case of the Partition of the Neutra1 Zone. 
Id. at 81–82. 
112. N. Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 61 (Rivero, J., concurring). 
113. Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 1982 I.C.J. 18, 278 (Feb. 
24) (Evensen, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Libya/Tunisia Continental Shelf]. 
114. Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf Area between Iceland and 
Jan Mayen, (Ice.-Nor.), June 1981, 27 R.I.A.A. 1. 
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A more serious question to me, however, is to what 
extent economic considerations should lead to the 
acceptance of faits accomplis; that is to say: should the 
dividing line be drawn in such a manner as to recognize 
unilaterally granted concessions by one of the Parties to 
the detriment of the other? Or wells drilled by either 
Party in an area in dispute? Such an approach would 
possibly be contrary to international law as well as to 
equity. The delimitation of the continental shelf between 
adjacent (and opposite) States is, in principle, to be 
determined by agreement between the Parties, which is 
just the opposite of unilateral action either in the form 
of unilateral legislative actions, the unilateral granting 
of concessions in a disputed area, or, more serious still, 
by drilling wells and starting up petroleum production 
in disputed areas. Any acceptance by the Court that the 
drilling of oil-wells, in an area which was disputed, 
should have any relevance for the delimitation, would 
really be an invitation to Parties to violate certain basic 
trends laid down in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1958 and the draft convention of 1981 [UNCLOS], and 
might invite aggressive attitudes, through the staking 
out of claims, instead of conciliatory approaches.115 
. . . . 
. . . There may be other elements in the delimitation 
process and in the delimitation results than the bare 
drawing of lines: elements that may make a line or a 
system of delimitation more just and equitable than 
otherwise might have been the case.  
 In the present case, the underlying immediate 
concerns are first and foremost petroleum exploitation. 
But it is a well-known fact that petroleum exploitation 
is a mixture of know-how and luck. The drawing of a 
line of delimitation between States may, as far as oil 
potentials are concerned, be a pure gamble, an accidental 
fact which may leave rich structures on one side of the 
line and barrenness on the other.  
                                               
115. Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 318 (Evensen, J., dissenting). 
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 An arrangement for joint exploration, user or even 
joint jurisdiction over restricted overlapping areas may 
be a corollary to other equity considerations.116 
. . . . 
 In addition, the following system of joint exploitation 
of petroleum resources may be indicated. On both sides 
of the straightened line a line veering some 10º–15º 
from the delimitation line should be drawn. The areas 
thus indicated should be of approximately the same 
size. The two areas thus indicated should constitute a 
joint exploitation zone.  
 For this joint exploitation zone, the Parties should 
establish a joint policy of exploration and exploitation.117 
. . . . 
 Each Party should have the possibility to participate 
in the petroleum activities in the restricted area of the 
other Party as defined above, with 50 per cent 
participation either directly or through concessionaires. 
The national Party should have the right to be the 
operator unless otherwise agreed.  
 Each Party would have to pay the costs involved in 
the exploration and exploitation in accordance with the 
percentage of his participation.  
 The Parties should establish a permanent consultative 
committee for activities in the joint exploitation areas.  
 In case disagreements should arise out of activities in 
the aforementioned areas which the Parties were not 
able to solve by agreement, conciliation procedures and 
arbitration procedures should be provided for.  
 Likewise, unitization procedures should be provided 
in order to regulate the exploitation and the shared 
ownership where a petroleum deposit either straddles 
the line of delimitation or the outer lines restricting the 
zones of joint exploration.118 
. . . . 
                                               
116. Id. at 320. 
117. Id. at 321. 
118. Id. 
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 In his interesting separate opinion, Judge Jessup 
dwells on the questions of co-operation and unitization 
in some detail. I respectfully share his views that: even 
if the principle of co-operation “is not considered to 
reveal an emerging rule of international law, (it) may  
at least be regarded as an elaboration of the factors to 
be taken into account in the negotiations now to be 
undertaken by the Parties”.  
 There are a number of examples where the question of 
unitization has been dealt with expressly in agreements 
on the delimitation of the continental shelf.119 
. . . . 
 It seems advisable that the Parties in the present case 
in the agreement referred to in Article 2 of the Special 
Agreement should include provisions on unitization in 
cases where a petroleum field is situated on both sides 
of the dividing line or the dividing line for the above 
proposed zone of joint exploitation.120 
In the case of the Evensen opinion, as the above paragraphs 
show, the judge even went into detail and proposed the terms of 
the possible agreement between the Parties. It is noteworthy that 
after the litigation the two States reached a joint exploitation 
agreement in the area under dispute in the case, the Gulf of 
Gabes, using Evensen’s recommendations even though it was 
provided in a dissenting opinion. 
From the above discussion from the World Court on State 
practice and the principles enshrined in international law it is 
clear that the principle of joint development is further supported 
by economic and technical factors121—it avoids or reduces 
wasteful exploitation and economic cost of repeated construction 
of drilling facilities and allows for sharing of infrastructure; it 
maximizes the ultimate recovery of petroleum from the reservoir 
by the employment of the best scientifically and technically 
enhanced methods; it protects correlative rights in the common 
reservoir; it minimizes the use of seabed and damage by 
                                               
119. Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 322 (Evensen, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 323. 
121. See Weaver & Asmus, supra note 33, at 11–12 (listing these factors). 
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avoiding unnecessary drilling; and it promotes international 
cooperation and peaceful co-existence122 
Finally, offshore safety may be enhanced through coordinated 
search and rescue operations, and cooperative pollution cleanup 
response.123 From all of these sources taken together, UNCLOS 
and the progressive development of international customary  
law has crystallized three primary guiding principles for 
transboundary resource development: Coastal States must: (1) 
exercise mutual restraint from undertaking activities within its 
jurisdiction that would cause damage to the natural resources or 
environment of the neighboring State; (2) consult and negotiate 
with neighboring States; and (3) negotiate in good faith with 
neighboring States.124 
Existing international law, therefore, prescribes only general 
rules requiring the parties to cooperate, and does not specify 
what agreement needs to be reached. International law provides 
only “rules of engagement,”125 although some experts, as seen in 
ICJ separate opinions cited above, contend that joint exploitation 
and unitization are the corollaries to the principles of equity and 
cooperation. This approach is also consistent with the fact that 
in most of the treaties dealing with transboundary resources, 
States have emphasized the need to exploit them in the most 
“efficient” way, and treating the reservoir as a unit achieves that 
goal. Nevertheless, the only element that is settled is that 
international law cannot compel a nation to accept the idea of 
combining or unitizing the production from a transboundary 
hydrocarbon reservoir with another nation if it is not willing  
to do so. It therefore remains the prerogative of each nation  
to choose whether to consent to a transboundary petroleum 
development agreement.126 Moreover, neither UNCLOS nor 
international customary law addresses the issue whether there 
is any remedy available to a nation that has unsuccessfully 
engaged in getting its neighbor to cooperatively exploit. 
                                               
122. Id. at 12. 
123. Betsy Baker, Filling an Arctic Gap: Legal and Regulatory Possibilities for 
Canadian-U.S. Cooperation in the Beaufort Sea, 34 VT. L. REV. 57, 72–73 (2009). 
124. Cameron, supra note 98, at 565–67. 
125. Id. at 561. 
126. Id. 
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Consequently it is important to review how the States have 
engaged in other cases dealing with shared resources in order  
to conclude how they conceive the substance of the above-
recognized principles of international law. The bilateral practice 
in this sense, and even the bilateral custom if it can be proved, is 
essential for the analysis of the case at hand. 
D.   State Practice: Agreements Used to Coordinate Development 
of Transboundary Reservoirs 
Once nations agree to jointly develop the transboundary 
hydrocarbon reservoir(s) or field(s) they can enter into a variety 
of agreements. The two most commonly used forms of agreements 
are cross-border unitization agreements and joint development 
agreements. 
1.   Cross-Border Unitization 
Cross-border unitization is the joint and coordinated 
exploitation of a transboundary hydrocarbon reservoir by the 
interested nations so that the reservoir is developed as if it were 
owned and controlled by a single unit.127 Cross-border unitization 
requires an established boundary agreement between the affected 
governments.128 Professor Jacqueline Weaver describes the 
following typical attributes of cross-border unitization: 
•   Cross-border unitization is only required once a 
discovery is made. 
•   The area covered by the unitization agreement is 
defined by the extent of the individual reservoir or field. 
•   The two countries collaborate (through a treaty or 
other international agreement) on issues related to 
optimum field development (including, for example, 
safety), but maintain their sovereign rights on each 
side of the border. 
                                               
127. See Székely, supra note 27, at 766 (discussing the different States that have 
these types of arrangements and the emerging principles of conventional law that have 
resulted from them). 
128. Patson W. Arinaitwe, Exploitation of Offshore Transboundary Oil and Gas 
Reservoirs; An International Law Perspective, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2486488. 
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•   The groups of licensees prepare a single development 
plan and a unit operating agreement, which are then 
subject to the approval of both countries. 
•   Each license group’s share of production and costs  
is based on the proportionate share (called the 
participation factor) of the field’s oil and gas in place 
underlying its license, regardless of the physical 
location of the production facilities. Each licensee 
pays its taxes and royalties in accord with the terms 
of its own contract as if its unit share of production 
had been produced from its own contract area. 
•   The legal framework maintains two separate sets of 
regulations and fiscal terms.129 
In general terms, a transboundary unitization treaty 
addresses production allocations and costs among tracts; 
regulation; the cooperative work plan for the field agreed upon 
by the operating investors; and a dispute-resolution plan.130 
Unitization also requires the licensees on each side of the 
boundary to enter into a unit operating agreement. This 
agreement will govern the rights and obligations between the 
licensees and the selected unit operator, who manages the 
day-to-day operations of the unit. Both governments must 
approve these agreements in order to assure that they are 
consistent with the terms of the treaty.131 
2.   Joint Development Agreements 
Another way to develop transboundary hydrocarbon 
reservoirs is to establish a joint development zone, within which 
cooperative development of petroleum occurs despite disputes 
over sovereignty and the delimitation of the boundary between 
two or more nations. Joint Development Agreements authorize 
the cooperative development of petroleum resources in a 
geographic area that has disputed sovereignty, despite the 
                                               
129. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 33, at 14–15. 
130. Jose Antonio Prado & Alejandro Landa Thierry, United States: U.S.-Mexico 
Agreement Update on the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs, MONDAQ (July 30, 
2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/331284. 
131. Id. 
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delimitation of the boundary between two or more sovereigns.132 
Although existing agreements vary in structure, key issues in 
joint development agreements can be identified as being 
particularly important, as described by Ana E. Bastida: 
1) Sharing resources: contractual provisions establish the 
basis for sharing production. There is overwhelming 
support for the principle of equal sharing, but there are 
exceptions.133 
2) Management of joint development: three categories of 
management structures have been identified—single State 
model; two States/joint venture model, and joint authority 
model. 
3) Applicable law: this provision is necessary to clarify which 
legal regime will apply in the joint development zone.  
It should include the petroleum licensing regime, laws 
governing civil and criminal jurisdiction over individuals 
in the zone, and rules and regulations governing health, 
safety and environmental issues. 
4) Operator and position of contractors: provisions that point 
out who has the authority to develop rules for selecting 
contractors to undertake petroleum exploration and 
exploitation activities on behalf of the two States. 
5) Financial provisions: it establishes the taxation regime 
applied to contractors in the joint develop zone. 
6) Dispute resolution: normally, it provides for some sort of 
internal mechanism of conflict resolution prior to resorting 
to third party resolution, such as consultation, negotiation, 
conciliation, and binding commercial arbitration.134 
There are areas in the Gulf of Mexico where a Joint 
Development Agreement may be warranted in the future, such as 
in the portion of the Eastern GOM where maritime boundaries 
between the United States, Mexico, and Cuba have not been 
                                               
132. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 33, at 15. 
133. For example, the Senegal-Guinea-Bissau agreement of 1993 calls for an 85:15 
split in favor of Senegal for petroleum resources, but 50:50 for fishing rights. Bastida et 
al., supra note 15, at 415–16. 
134. Id. at 415–19. 
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formally delimited.135 However, the U.S. and Mexico have already 
agreed to a framework agreement to jointly develop hydrocarbons 
along most of the maritime boundary between the United States 
and Mexico in the GOM.136 This framework agreement, described 
in the next sections, establishes the procedures to move forward 
on transboundary unitization in the event that a shared reservoir 
is discovered. 
3.   Examples of Transboundary Agreements that Protect the 
Efficient Exploitation of the Resource 
One of the most used models for joint exploitation agreements 
was the one celebrated by the United Kingdom and Norway  
in 1965, where the basic principle of joint exploitation was 
enshrined in Article 4: 
If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum 
field, or any single geological structure or field of any 
other mineral deposit, including sand or gravel, extends 
across the dividing line and the part of such structure 
or field which is situated on one side of the dividing line 
is exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side  
of the dividing line, the Contracting Parties shall, in 
consultation with the licensees, if any, seek to reach 
agreement as to the manner in which the structure or 
field shall be most effectively exploited and the manner 
in which the proceeds deriving therefrom shall be 
apportioned.137 
                                               
135. See Harriet L. Nash & Richard J. McLaughlin, A Policy Approach to Establish 
an International Network of Marine Protected Areas in the Gulf of Mexico Region, 6 
AUSTL. J. MAR. & OCEAN AFF., 1, 13 (2014) (describing the legal status of this portion of 
the Gulf of Mexico). 
136. See H.R. REP. NO. 113-101, at 1 (2013) (amending the outer continental shelf 
lands act, and approving the transboundary hydrocarbon agreement). The term 
“Agreement” rather than “Treaty” is used because the Obama Administration decided to 
transmit the instrument to Congress as an executive agreement rather than a formal 
treaty. Id. at 4. 
137. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway relating to the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the Two Countries, U.K.-Nor., art. 4,  
Mar. 10, 1965, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ 
PDFFILES/TREATIES/GBR-NOR1965CS.PDF. 
Do Note Delete 6/1/15  1:50 PM 
724 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37:3 
The same type of provision was contained in the 
delimitation of the continental shelf agreement between Sweden 
and Norway in 1968 and between the United Kingdom and 
Norway of 1965. It is important to note that the latter even 
made it mandatory to sign a unitization agreement (“shall be 
concluded”) between the licensees on both sides of the border 
upon the request of the States.138 Similar clauses and principles 
were proposed by the Jan Mayen Conciliation Commission 
between Iceland and Norway, where the commission suggested 
the adoption of a joint development zone and the unitization  
of deposits for the overlapping areas of the continental shelf 
that cross the boundary.139 Iceland and Norway took the 
recommendations and in 1981 adopted the Agreement on the 
Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen.140 
In the Asian continent, similar provisions have been found 
regarding the sharing of transboundary resources where the 
principle of joint development and of agreeing on the most 
effective method of exploitation is present. For example the 1974 
Japan and South Korea Agreement provides in Article XXIII: 
If any single geological structure or field of natural 
resources extends across any of the lines specified in 
paragraph 1 of article II and the part of such structure 
or field which is situated on one side of such lines is 
exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side of 
such lines, concessionaires and other persons authorized 
by either Party to exploit such structure or field 
(hereinafter referred to as “concessionaires and other 
persons”) shall, through consultations, seek to reach 
agreement as to the most effective method of exploiting 
such structure or field.141 
                                               
138. Bastida et al., supra note 15, at 391–93. 
139. Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf Area between Iceland and 
Jan Mayen, supra note 114, at 3. 
140. Agreement on Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Ice.-Nor., 
Oct. 22, 1981, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/ 
PDFFILES/TREATIES/ISL-NOR1981CS.PDF. 
141. Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the 
Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, Japan-S. Kor., art. XXIII, Jan. 30, 1974, 
1225 U.N.T. S. 1977 [hereinafter Japan-Korea Treaty]. 
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A similar article is found in the Australia-Indonesia 
Agreement of 1989: 
If any single accumulation of petroleum extends across 
any of the boundary lines of Area A of the Zone of 
Cooperation as designated and described in Article 1 
and Annex A of this Treaty, and the part of such 
accumulation that is situated on one side of a line is 
exploitable, wholly or in part, from the other side of  
the line, the Contracting States shall seek to reach 
agreement on the manner in which the accumulation 
shall be most effectively exploited and on the equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from such exploitation.142 
And then in more detail in the Annex A of the Agreement it 
states that unitization shall be the rule for this type of 
resources: 
Where a petroleum pool is partly within a contract area 
and partly within another contract area, but wholly 
within Area A, the Joint Authority shall require the 
contractors to enter into a unitization agreement with 
each other within a reasonable time, as determined by 
the Joint Authority, for the purpose of securing the more 
effective and optimized production of petroleum from 
the pool. If no agreement has been reached within such 
reasonable time, the Joint Authority shall decide on the 
unitization agreement. Without limiting the matters to 
be dealt with, the unitization agreement shall define or 
contain the approach to define the amount of petroleum 
in each contract area, the method of producing the 
petroleum, and shall appoint the contract operator 
responsible for production of the petroleum covered by 
the unitization agreement. The Joint Authority shall 
approve the unitization agreement before approvals 
under Article 17 of this Petroleum Mining Code are 
given. Any changes to the unitization agreement shall 
be subject to approval by the Joint Authority.143 
                                               
142. Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian 
Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, Austl.-Indon., art. 20, Dec. 11, 1989, 
1991 Austl. Treaty Series 9 [hereinafter Timor Gap Treaty]. 
143. Id. art. 21. 
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The sources of international law presented in this Part show 
a clear trend on what the State obligations are when they face 
the natural phenomenon of transboundary resources: they must 
cooperate to find a method of exploitation where the resources 
are exploited in an efficient way benefiting and respecting the 
rights of both States. Exploiting a resource unilaterally without 
respecting and recognizing the rights of the other parties to the 
hydrocarbons contained in the field is clearly contrary to the 
international law sources described in this Part. In following 
this obligation, most States have chosen to respect the principle 
of unitization as the most appropriate one for achieving this. 
Although the general rule is clear, the way States in their 
bilateral relations have been able to accomplish a joint 
exploitation of the resource is an important part of the way the 
norm has developed. As such, the following Part will undertake 
a detailed analysis of the binational practice between the United 
States and Mexico in handling transboundary resources in other 
areas, such as rivers, in order to identify particular ways in which 
these two nations have dealt with similar issues. Particular 
attention will be given to the treatment of rivers along the U.S.-
Mexico border. Part VI will also have a detailed examination of 
the substantive provisions and international legal implications 
of the landmark 2012 Transboundary Agreement. One the  
key characteristics of this agreement, unlike other existing 
international cross-boundary hydrocarbon treaties, is that the 
2012 Transboundary Agreement allows the parties to exploit 
transboundary reservoirs unilaterally in the absence of an 
approved unitization agreement. The final portion of the study 
examines whether these provisions are compatible with the 
described existing principles of international law.144 
IV.   U.S. AND MEXICO BILATERAL PRACTICE  
ON TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES 
Under international law, bilateral practice can eventually 
generate a bilateral customary norm that governs the relations 
between the States in particular matters if the requirements of 
                                               
144. See infra Part VII.A. 
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state practice and opinion juris are met.145 Mexico and the 
United States have faced before the challenge of managing 
transboundary resources. An important example involves the 
use and distribution of the water contained in several rivers that 
cross the border. Just as is the case with oil and gas contained in 
reservoirs, the water in international rivers is the property of 
both nations. How the water is distributed varies depending on 
the particular physical elements of the river. Some of these 
rivers have their origin in Mexican territory and flow to the 
United States, others have origins in the United States and flow 
south. Hence the possibility of both nations unilaterally abusing 
the resources is present. To avoid such a practice, both States 
decided to rely on established international practice and to create 
a binational commission that would administer the exploitation 
of water resources, invest where needed, and decide technical 
matters.146 An important aspect of the commission’s decisions is 
that they are final and binding upon both parties. This has been 
the practice since 1848 and is reflected in several treaties that 
deal with inland border issues.147 Some commentators have 
argued that these binational regimes were “a dramatic turning 
point in the legal stance of the United States on its sovereign 
rights concerning water resources. Until that date the U.S. side 
maintained that it had absolute right to use the water resources 
in its territory as it wished.”148 
For example the 1906 Treaty for the Rio Bravo, stated 
explicitly that the neighboring States should share in an equitable 
way the distribution of the waters contained in the border.149 
                                               
145. See supra Part III.C. 
146. Treaty on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of 
the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., art. 2, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 U.S. 
Mexico Rivers Treaty]. 
147. See History of the International Boundary and Water Commission, INT’L 
BOUNDARY & WATER COMMISSION, http://www.ibwc.gov/About_Us/history.html (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2015) (“The IBWC traces its roots to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo and the Gadsden Treaty of 1853, which established temporary joint commissions 
to survey, map, and demarcate with ground landmarks the new U.S.-Mexico boundary.”). 
148. 10 RONGXING GUO, CROSS-BORDER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 291 (S.V. Krupa 
ed., 2d ed. 2012). 
149. Convention on the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande, 
U.S.-Mex., Proclamation, arts. 1–2, May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953. 
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The same principle was adopted in the 1944 U.S. and Mexico 
Rivers Treaty, where the International Boundary and Water 
Commission (IBWC) was created and according to Article 2 
“shall in all respects have the status of an international body.”150 
Furthermore, the Commission was entrusted to regulate and 
exercise the rights that both States have over the resources: 
The application of the present Treaty, the regulation 
and exercise of the rights and obligations which the two 
Governments assume thereunder, and the settlement  
of all disputes to which its observance and execution 
may give rise are hereby entrusted to the International 
Boundary and Water Commission.151 
In other words, the creation of this supranational 
international body, would exercise the rights and duties of both 
parties on those resources, resolve all the disputes arising out  
of their exploitation, and have the final word on their 
administration. An important aspect of the operation of the IBWC 
is that its officers and employees are given special diplomatic 
status to visit both sides of the border freely.152 In the same vein, 
the expenses incurred “as agreed upon by the Commission, shall 
be born equally by the two Governments.”153 The type of 
economic interests that this joint exploitation regime touches 
are very diverse, and the Treaty even includes an order of 
preferences for the Commission to consider.154 The IBWC has 
been empowered to construct, operate and maintain storage 
dams and reservoirs, the first one being the Rio Grande 
Rectification project in 1933. Regarding the qualification of the 
                                               
150. 1944 U.S. Mexico Rivers Treaty, supra note 146, art. 2. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. (“The Commissioner, two principal engineers, a legal adviser, and a 
secretary, designated by each Government as members of its Section of the Commission, 
shall be entitled in the territory of the other country to the privileges and immunities 
appertaining to diplomatic officers. The Commission and its personnel may freely carry 
out their observations, studies and field work in the territory of either country.”). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. art. 3 (“In matters in which the Commission may be called upon to make 
provision for the joint use of international waters, the following order of preferences 
shall serve as a guide: 1. Domestic and municipal uses. 2. Agriculture and stock-raising. 
3. Electric power. 4. Other industrial uses. 5. Navigation. 6. Fishing and hunting. 7. Any 
other beneficial uses which may be determined by the Commission.”). 
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head of each section, Article 2 states that it “shall be an Engineer 
Commissioner;” as a way to ensuring that the IBWC will function 
in a technical capacity to guarantee the efficient exploitation 
and distribution of the joint resource, rather than as a political 
or diplomatic body where other interests might overshadow the 
efficiency of the regime.155 
Most scholars agree that the IBWC has been effective in 
achieving the basic goals prescribed by the treaty regime: avoid 
conflicts between the States and foster cooperation of the 
efficient management of the resources.156 Nevertheless, they also 
                                               
155. Id. art. 2; see INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FY  
2011–FY 2016, at 21 (2011) (ensuring “the allocation of Rio Grande and Colorado River 
waters, including the accurate measurement and accounting of these waters, in 
accordance with the 1906 Convention and the 1944 Treaty”). 
156. Although most literature agree that the IBWC has been efficient in achieving 
high levels of cooperation between the United States and Mexico, a number of 
commentators argue that some changes must be made to the Treaty in order to prevent 
particular issues such as unexpected droughts or extreme climate change conditions. 
Stephen P. Mumme, Managing Acute Water Scarcity on the U.S.-Mexico Border: 
Institutional Issues Raised by the 1990’s Drought, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, 166 (1999) 
[hereinafter Mumme, Managing] (“The impact of the 1990’s drought (dare we say 
extraordinary impact?) certainly draws attention to the limitations of the current 
international drought management system along the U.S.-Mexico border. While it is 
commendable that the IBWC, with the cooperation of Texas state officials, struck a 
temporary agreement (Minute 293) to provide water relief to Mexico, this review shows 
that the Minute 293 solution falls well short of addressing a range of important drought 
management questions affecting U.S.-Mexican relations.”); see also Stephen Mumme, 
Innovation and Reform in Transboundary Resource Management: A Critical Look at the 
International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 33 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 93, 93 (1993) [hereinafter Mumme, Innovation] (“The International 
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) may well represent the finest example of 
functional cooperation in transboundary resources management between highly dissimilar 
countries anywhere on the globe.”). See Jurgen Schmandt, Bi-National Water Issues  
in the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Basin, 4 WATER POL’Y 137, 152 (2002) (“What has been 
discussed so far are partial reform: more is needed. The time is ripe to upgrade the 
existing structure for bi-national water managements. The 1944 Treaty between Mexico 
and the United States provides a foundation on which the two countries can build.”), for 
a discussion on the quality of the water and droughts. See Melissa Lopez, Border 
Tensions and the Need for Water: An Application of Equitable Principles to Determine 
Water Allocation from the Rio Grande to the United States and Mexico, 9 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 489, 489 (1997) (“As co-riparians along the Rio Grande, the United States 
and Mexico have historically had to deal with border conflicts regarding water rights. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the two countries have entered into various 
agreements to resolve the conflicts. For the most part, the countries have cooperated 
successfully to ensure that their respective water needs have been met.”), for a discussion 
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agree there have been some areas where the regime and the 
Commission could improve their work, such as the quality of the 
water and facing the challenges of droughts with the expansion 
of the cities along the border.157 It may be expected that a treaty 
that was created in an era where climate change challenges, 
aggressive industrialization and excessive urbanization in the 
border were unconceivable, has particular challenges facing these 
phenomena. But regardless of its flaws, there is a consensus that 
the basis of the treaty regime can be considered as a successful 
exercise and a step forward in U.S. and Mexico relations. In fact, 
the States considered that the IBWC was so effective in achieving 
its tasks, that in 1970 it was even empowered by both States to 
establish the international maritime boundary of Mexico and 
the United States in the first twelve nautical miles.158 In the 
words of Professor Jorge Vargas, a former Legal Advisor of the 
Office of Boundaries and International Waters of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Mexico: 
[M]any coastal states in the international community 
started to advance maritime claims over contiguous 
marine areas, such as was the case of Mexico enlarging 
its territory in 1969, both the United States and Mexico 
agreed that since the IBWC was already engaged  
in establishing a more practical and convenient river 
boundary along certain segments of the international 
line, it was only proper to ask that Commission to  
also address the question of establishing the new 
international maritime boundary of a twelve-nautical-
                                               
proposing changes to the legal framework in which the Commission operates. 
157. See Mumme, Managing, supra note 156, at 166 (“As seen above, there is, in 
fact, a good deal that can be done to better manage protracted droughts along the border 
short of attempting to renegotiate the water treaties allocating water along the major 
international rivers.”); see Mumme, Innovation, supra note 156 (stating “additional 
development is possible in several areas, to include sanitation and water quality, 
instream flow, and creative approaches to project financing”); see Schmandt, supra note 
156, at 152; Lopez, supra note 156, at 508 (“The current legal regime governing water 
allocation between the United States and Mexico must be re-evaluated to cope more 
effectively with these changes and respond to and prevent emergencies such as the 
northern Mexican drought.”). 
158. Jorge A. Vargas, The 2012 U.S.-Mexico Agreement on Transboundary 
Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico: A Blueprint for Progress or a Recipe for 
Conflict?, 14 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 3, 15–16 (2012). 
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mile territorial sea in the Gulf of Mexico (starting at the 
center of the mouth of the Rio Grande), and the same 
maritime boundary in the Pacific Ocean (beginning at 
the western most point of the mainland boundary).159 
The United States and Mexico also agreed to face jointly the 
challenges concerning environmental protection in their border 
areas with joint commissions. In 1993 they signed an Agreement 
that gave birth to the Border Environmental Cooperation 
Commission (BECC) and the North American Development 
Bank.160 The purpose of both institutions is to create the 
necessary infrastructure to address the environmental 
consequences of NAFTA by sharing the costs and creating the 
necessary incentives to attract private parties to join the effort.161 
In its preamble, the Agreement affirmed that both States 
recognized: 
the bilateral nature of many transboundary 
environmental issues, and that such issues can be most 
effectively addressed jointly . . . [and] that there is a 
need to establish a new organization to strengthen 
cooperation among interested parties and to facilitate 
the financing, construction, operation and maintenance 
of environmental infrastructure projects in the border 
region.162 
One of the interesting aspects of the BECC is that it certifies 
private parties in order to receive financial aid from the Bank to 
achieve the goals of the Agreement, and in the process receive 
observations from NGOs or other private parties interested. 
It is also important to note that Mexico and the United 
States have also signed other bilateral treaties recognizing the 
joint responsibility and the rights of both States to exploit other 
resources, such as migrant species and the use of radio 
frequencies. The United States has also agreed with other 
nations to manage and exploit resources in a binational or 
                                               
159. Id. at 17–18. 
160. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environmental 
Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank, U.S.-Mex., Intro. 
Notice, Nov. 16, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1545. 
161. Id. pmbl. 
162. Id. 
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multinational way. An example of such U.S. practice is the 1957 
Convention between the United States, Canada, Japan and the 
former Soviet Union concerning fur seals of the North Pacific 
Oceans, where the Americans and the Soviets agreed to harvest 
the living resources and share the products with the other two 
nations.163 This treaty even contained in its amended version of 
1962 a principle of effectiveness in the “management and the 
rational utilization” of the resources.164 
Notwithstanding, the trend of both nations to deal with 
transboundary resources issues through bilateral commissions, 
there are a few examples of shared resources that have not been 
exploited or managed in a binational way. One such example 
involves possible transboundary gas and oil reservoirs in the 
Texas and Tamaulipas inland border area. On both sides of the 
U.S.-Mexico border there are wells already extracting gas from 
this shared reservoir, 174 wells in Texas and 9 in Tamaulipas, 
but neither Mexico nor the United States has chosen to address 
the issue officially.165 Professor Vargas concludes that “Mexico 
has not taken any diplomatic steps to bring to the attention of 
the United States this apparent disproportionate utilization of 
the natural gas coming from this ‘transboundary reservoir,’ that 
seems to run contrary to the international law principles that 
advocates ‘the efficient and equitable exploitation’ of the resources 
contained in any kind of these reservoirs.”166 But regardless of 
these exceptions, the evidence suggests that in general U.S. and 
Mexico bilateral practice, when the States have faced the 
exploitation of transboundary resources in the past, they have 
                                               
163. Convention of Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, art. IX, Feb. 9, 1957, 
314 U.N.T.S. 4546. 
164. Protocol Amending the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific 
Fur Seals, Oct. 8, 1963, T.I.A.S. 5558. The major changes to the treaty are reflected in 
Article II of this act: 
1. In Article II, paragraph 2 of the Convention, “and” at the end of 
sub-paragraph (f) shall be deleted and “(g)” shall be replaced by “(i)”. 
2. After Article II, paragraph 2(f) of the Convention, the following shall be 
inserted: “(g) effectiveness of each method of sealing from the viewpoint of 
management and rational utilization of fur seal resources for conservation 
purposes.” 
165. Vargas, supra note 158, at 39. 
166. Id. 
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built a joint administration and exploitation regime, where the 
mechanisms chosen include the creation of technical bilateral 
commissions with enough authority to decide the future of these 
resources. The fact that this practice began with the management 
of rivers is consistent with the international practice recognized 
in some of the ICJ opinions mentioned above.167 
After analyzing all of the different sources of international law 
that deal with transboundary resources, it is safe to conclude that 
the obligation to cooperate that arises under the international 
norms described in Part III is consistent with the binational 
practice of the United States and Mexico described in the above 
paragraphs. Both nations have recognized the rights to exploit 
these resources on both sides of the border, but at the same time 
have constrained the exercise of these rights by creating 
binational bodies that seek to manage the resource in the most 
efficient way for the benefit of both parties. The next Parts of 
this Article will analyze if this binational practice that enshrines 
the international norm is followed by both States when in comes 
to hydrocarbon resources in the GOM. It will begin in Part V 
with a review of the international treaties that deal with the 
maritime boundary in the GOM and how these constantly faced 
the issue of transboundary resources without being able to solve 
it directly in the treaties. Part VI will analyze the 2012 
Transboundary Agreement as the most important effort to deal 
with the transboundary phenomenon and will highlight the 
provisions of the Agreement that deviate from international 
practice and that could generate cooperation problems in the 
future. Finally, after taking into consideration all these aspects, 
Part VII will answer the initial question of this Article: Is the 
treaty consistent with existing principles of international law? 
                                               
167. See, e.g., N. Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 74 (Jessup, J., concurring) 
(examining agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia concerning a disputed offshore 
area). 
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V.   DEVELOPMENT OF BOUNDARY TREATIES  
IN THE GULF OF MEXICO 
A.   The Treaty of 1978 
The first effort of both States to regulate the maritime 
border areas of the GOM and their continental platforms was 
the Treaty on Maritime Boundaries between the United Mexican 
States and the United States of America of 1978.168 In it, Mexico 
and the United States treated differently the maritime boundaries 
of the GOM and the Pacific due to the different geographical 
realities that the continental platform presented in each: 
basically because the GOM is a semi-enclosed sea. To delineate 
the border, the States agreed to employ the equidistance method 
from twelve nautical miles, the territorial sea, out to 200 nautical 
miles. The method employed resulted in the existence of two 
polygons or “gaps” in the Gulf to which the maritime rights of 
both States overlapped, since they were beyond the 200 nautical 
miles established in the Convention (the western gap is shared 
by Mexico and the United States, while the eastern gap is shared 
also with Cuba), as shown in the following map that was annexed 
to the 1978 Treaty.169 
                                               
168. Treaty on Maritime Boundaries, U.S.-Mex., arts. I, III, May 4, 1978, 2143 
U.N.T.S. 405 [hereinafter 1978 Treaty]. 
169. Id. at 3. 
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Mexico and the United States decided to leave the two 
polygons outside of the treaty and subject to future negotiations. 
The starting points for the equidistance method were  
the Isles Dernieres from the U.S. side, and the Alacranes 
Islands north of the Yucatán Peninsula. Years later, Mexican 
congressmen complained that the negotiators did not consider 
the sudden disappearance of an island further to the north of the 
Alacranes Islands, the Bermeja. This island could have given 
around 15% of additional offshore territory to Mexico.170 The 
Bermeja Island appeared in several nautical maps since 1669, it 
                                               
170. Mexican Senate Information Requirement to the Mexican Executive on the 
Disappearance of the Bermejo Island 1 (Oct. 21, 2008) (Mex.), available at http://sil. 
gobernacion.gob.mx/Archivos/Documentos/2008/10/asun_2486656_20081021_1224603811.
pdf (urging the executive to submit a comprehensive report concerning the 
disappearance of the Bermeja Mexican territory located in the Gulf of Mexico). See 
generally ELÍAS CÁRDENAS, ¿DÓNDE ESTÁ LA ISLA BERMEJA?: ESTUDIO MULTIDISPLINARIO 
SOBRE LA POSIBLE EXISTENCIA Y DESTINO DE LA ISLA BERMEJA: ANÁLISIS OCEANOGRÁFICO, 
AÉREO Y GEOHISTÓRICO-CARTOGRÁFICO [Where is the Island?: Bermeja Multidisciplinary 
Study on the Possibility and Destination of Bermeja Island: Oceanographical Analysis, 
Air and Geohistorical Mapping] (2010). 
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was included in the maps of the independence of Mexico up  
to the middle of the 20th century. Nevertheless, when the 
delimitation of the maritime boundary was being negotiated in 
1978 the experts determined that the island had submerged  
40 meters below the surface to a point that it could not be 
considered anymore an island.171 As of today, the sudden 
disappearance of Bermeja and what caused it is still a mystery. 
The Treaty of 1978 was completely silent regarding the 
existence of shared transboundary resources. This omission was 
odd because the practice at the international level by other 
States already showed that as a preventive measure, especially 
in areas rich in hydrocarbon deposits like the Gulf, States would 
include in their treaties a clause like the one contained in the 
UK-Norway 1965 treaty recognizing the need to reach an 
agreement to exploit the resource in the most effective way.  
In fact, the 1978 Treaty was explicit in only mentioning the 
maritime boundary and excluding the concept of a continental 
shelf. In the single paragraph where the 1978 Treaty mentioned 
the existence of the seabed and subsoil, it only stated that 
neither side shall “claim or exercise for any purpose sovereign 
rights or jurisdiction over the waters or seabed and subsoil” on the 
other country’s side of the boundary,172 consequently excluding 
any possibility of exploiting a transboundary hydrocarbon 
deposit by either side.173 Professor Jorge Vargas has argued that 
the purpose of the wording of the article was precisely the 
exclusion of any type of exploitation without the consent of the 
other party: 
When this treaty was being negotiated (first in 1976 and 
later in 1978) there was no certainty at that time, based 
on geological and other scientific data, of the existence  
of such a transboundary reservoir either in the Gulf of 
                                               
171. See Mexico’s Missing Island, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/ 
documentaries/2009/09/090910_world_stories_mexico_missing_island.shtml (last updated 
Sept. 10, 2009, 6:38 PM) (“Bermeja Island was clearly visible on national and international 
maps until the middle of the 20th century.”). 
172. 1978 Treaty, supra note 168, art. II. 
173. This statement did not exclude the possibility that the State could exploit the 
resources that are not considered as transboundary from their side of the border. 
Nevertheless, the question remained on what would happen if the resources that were 
being exploited happened to be or migrated to the other side. 
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Mexico or in the Pacific. To avoid any possibility that 
Mexico, or more likely the United States (given its 
technological advancement in the exploration and 
exploitation of submarine reservoirs in ultra-deep 
waters), would make any attempt to extract oil or natural 
gas from the other side of the maritime boundary, both 
parties explicitly added this language to Article II of this 
treaty to avoid or reject such claims, or the possible 
exercise of sovereignty rights over natural resources in 
that submarine area.174 
The 1978 Treaty was ratified by the Mexican Senate the 
same year it was signed, but the U.S. Senate took more than  
twenty years to ratify it under pressure from the industry that 
by then had developed enough technology to do deepwater 
drilling and was interested in the areas surrounding the pending 
borderline.175 In fact, the United States was already auctioning 
submarine tracts in the Western Gulf of Mexico in 1997 regardless 
of the fact that the Treaty had not been ratified. Mexico in the 
same year sent several diplomatic letters to the U.S. Department 
of State expressing that the actions taken by the Department of 
the Interior “would be in violation of international law and this 
would run contrary to resolving the matter in a just and equitable 
manner.”176 In a subsequent diplomatic note, Mexico took the 
following position: 
pursuant to conventional and customary international 
law, States are under the obligation of delimiting the 
continental shelf through a [bilateral] agreement and, 
therefore, if no [maritime delimitation] is agreed 
bilaterally, Mexico would object [to] any attempt by the 
United States of acquiring any submarine areas by 
unilateral possession (reivindicación); the adjudication 
                                               
174. Vargas, supra note 158, at 23–24. 
175. Treaty on Maritime Boundaries, U.S.-Mex., Oct. 22, 1997, S. Exec. D. 105-4. 
(Comment by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee) (“[T]he untapped reserves 
of crude oil and natural gas in the Gulf of Mexico along the 200 nautical mile boundary 
and the technological advances that have made it more likely that U.S. companies will 
recover these oil and gas deposits. The Department of the Interior was already receiving 
bids for exploration in this area . . . . Several new drilling vessels capable of operating in 
water depths of up to 10,000 feet were already under construction.”). 
176. Vargas, supra note 158, at 33 (diplomatic note from the Secretaría de 
Relaciones Exteriores, May 21, 1997). 
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of licenses for the exploration and exploitation of 
hydrocarbons; or the possible acquisition of rights by 
U.S. private companies in the [submarine] areas not yet 
delimited.177 
This declaration triggered the oil companies’ lobbyists in 
Washington to pressure the Senate to ratify the Treaty.178 In an 
industry where the sunken costs and the risks associated with 
the exploitation are enormously high, legal uncertainty regarding 
the enforcement of property rights scares away any type of 
investment. Even though the 1978 Treaty left questions such as 
transboundary resources unanswered, it removed the uncertainty 
over maritime boundaries that allowed the oil and gas industry 
to support the Treaty. 
B.   The 2000 Treaty 
Negotiations began in 1997 to delineate the Western Gap  
of the Gulf of Mexico, as shown in the map of Annex 1 of the  
2000 Treaty:179 
                                               
177. Id. (diplomatic note from the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, July 25, 
1997). 
178. Id. at 33. 
179. Treaty on Delimitation of Continental Shelf, Annex 1, U.S.-Mex., June 9, 2000, 
S. Exec. Doc. 106-39 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 Treaty]. 
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During the negotiation process Mexico continuously declared 
the importance of preserving and ensuring the efficient 
exploitation of possible resources contained in the Gap, respecting 
the international law principles of equity and reciprocity. Due to 
the fact that there were reports regarding the existence of 
transboundary resources, Mexico and the United States decided to 
appoint a binational commission of experts to conduct research 
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on the area.180 The results showed the existence of a uniform 
distribution of shared resources in the Gap and consequently  
the existence of transboundary resources. As such, the Treaty 
negotiators decided to draft adequate provisions in the agreement 
to leave no doubt on how the issue was to be handled.181 The 
negotiations led to the signing of the Treaty between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the United Mexican States on the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf of Mexico beyond 200 
Nautical Miles, where both States decided to recognize the 
mutual right to exploit the resources but left unanswered the 
way these would be exploited.182 In fact, the Treaty established a 
moratorium for the exploitation of the resources located with a 
2.8 nautical mile wide buffer zone along the boundary line of the 
Gap for ten years.183 According to Article I of the Treaty the 
method employed to divide the gap between both nations was 
equidistance, a continuation of what was employed in the 1978 
Treaty. As a result of this approach, Mexico obtained 61.78% of 
the Gap and the United States the remaining 38.12%, as shown 
in Annex 2 of the 2000 Treaty.184 
                                               
180. Vargas, supra note 158, at 32. 
181. Id. at 34–37 (discussing the operative provisions of the 2000 U.S.-Mexico 
delimitation treaty that resolved the issues found by the binational commission of 
experts that conducted research in the area and more specifically referring to “the 
recognition of the ‘possible existence of [oil and gas] transboundary reservoirs’ and the 
obligation by either party to ‘notify’ the existence of said reservoirs to the other party”). 
182. 2000 Treaty, supra note 179, at III. 
183. Id. at VII. 
184. See id. at 2 (providing the coordinates used in the calculation of percentages of 
the territory each country obtained); see also id. annex 2 (displaying a map of the divided 
territory). 
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It is noteworthy that, even though the exploitation of the 
resources was not addressed in the Treaty, the fact that the 
United States agreed to recognize the rights of both States over 
these resources and a moratorium for their exploitation, was  
a positive step in abandoning the possibility of unilateral 
exploitation from the U.S. side of the boundary. 
Another important operative aspect of the 2000 Treaty is the 
fact that both States committed themselves in Article IV to 
share the geological and geophysical information of the Western 
Gap on a regular basis. With such an intention the Parties 
agreed to meet periodically and exchange reports and to “seek to 
reach agreement for the efficient and equitable exploitation of 
such transboundary reservoirs.”185 
In sum, the 2000 Treaty regulated a 2.6 km2 area in the 
Western Gap of the Gulf of Mexico maritime boundary region; it 
established a moratorium of ten years for the exploitation of the 
transboundary resources located in them; and most importantly, 
it recognized the willingness of the parties to exploit 
transboundary resources in an efficient, equitable and bilateral 
                                               
185. Id. at VII. 
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manner. In this way it temporarily excluded the possibility of 
any unilateral exploitation until a future agreement was signed 
or the ten years period had passed. 
Due to the importance of this Treaty as a precedent for the 
2012 Transboundary Agreement, it is important to identify the 
intentions of the Parties regarding the question of transboundary 
resources in comparison to the 1978 Agreement. As mentioned 
in previous Parts of this study, the declarations of the State 
representatives are important in the formation of international 
law because they reflect the expectations of the State in terms  
of what the content of the international norms are.186 This is 
particularly important when it comes to rules of customary 
international law where opinio juris can be identified by 
analyzing the representative’s views at the time of the negotiation 
process. Accordingly, the Mexican delegation during the 
negotiation process of 2000 declared to the Mexican Congress 
that they were aware that there was an obligation, according  
to what they considered to be the international norm at the 
time, to exploit the resources in the form of a joint development 
zone or through unitization, but that due to the fact that the 
Mexican Constitution at the time prohibited any type of private 
participation in the sector and that only PEMEX as a 
representative of the Mexican State could exploit “national” 
resources, the delegation was unable to include in the Treaty any 
mention of unitization or joint development. In the words of 
Lourdes Melgar, the representative negotiator of the Ministry of 
Energy of Mexico at the time: 
Mexico, by arguing that its Constitution does not allow 
it to engage in joint exploration and exploitation 
activities with other companies, is contradicting 
international law and the best international practices 
in the sector . . . this is a fundamental point to keep in 
mind because we have to prepare the appropriate 
negotiations that allow us to establish joint exploitation 
and unitization agreements regarding transboundary 
resources. And to establish a regulatory agency to 
                                               
186. See supra Part III.C. 
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supervise such an exploration and exploitation of the 
transboundary resources.187 
The same point was emphasized by the head of the Legal 
Council Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, 
Ambassador Miguel Ángel González Felix, in the same 
Congressional hearing: 
When the Western Gap Treaty was being negotiated . . . 
the problem of transboundary resources was constantly 
coming up in the discussions . . . . Once these type of 
resources are confirmed to trespass the boundary into 
the other State, there are two phenomenon present that 
have been emphasized again and again in this hearing: 
the phenomena of the migration of the resource, in 
other words, once one of the parties tries to exploit the 
fields, the resource might migrate to the other side of 
the border; secondly, in addition to migrating, the fact 
that the field is not exploited in a bilateral way, may 
affect the pressure of the field and even make the 
reservoir collapse.188 
When asked by Congress how the situation had to be 
resolved by Mexico and what were the international obligations 
involved, Ambassador González Felix was clear in stating that 
Mexico had a practice, even recognized constitutionally, to work 
with its neighbors to make the best out of the resources in a 
bilateral way: 
[W]hen we analyze our Constitution, we find that in the 
sections where it makes reference to borderlines, either 
in the airspace or the sea, the constitution gives 
deference to international law. That is why, just as 
Ambassador Iruegas stated earlier, we have fifteen 
treaties that have as a subject shared resources. We 
have joint airspace with the U.S.; treaties that have to 
deal with borderlines and water inland; the treaty that 
gives life to the IBWC to manage the water in the 
rivers; a treaty that deals with the modulated radio 
                                               
187. Octavo Foro Reforma Energética [Eighth Energy Reform Forum] 8 (June  
5, 2008), available at http://www3.diputados.gob.mx/camara/content/download/194900/ 
468076/file/VE-20080605.pdf (quoting Lourdes Melgar). The versions presented in this 
study are translations by the authors of this study. 
188. Id. at 6 (quoting Ambassador Miguel Ángel González Felix). 
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frequency at the border. In order words, there are 
multiple examples, that the regime to deal with these 
issues is an international regime. In conclusion: there is 
nothing in our constitution that forbids us to negotiate 
an international treaty and the Constitution itself 
forces us to rely on international law; it forces us to look 
at the international practice . . . and when we looked at 
it, we realized that there are only two options, either we 
reach an agreement to be able to exploit and explore the 
resources in a joint way, or we accept an unrestricted 
principle such as the rule of capture . . . . Mexico cannot 
accept the rule of capture. In the same vein, it has 
always been more beneficial for Mexico in its 
international relations to regulate such phenomenon in 
a bilateral way than accept the existence of unilateral 
acts that could affect us.189 
The above statements, from the highest Mexican officials 
negotiating the 2000 Treaty, proves one important aspect of 
what Mexico thought the appropriate rule of international law 
to deal with transboundary resources is: the joint exploitation of 
the resources. This is not only due to what they considered to be 
the international practice at that time, but because to them, the 
Mexican Constitution could be interpreted as requiring Mexico 
to comply with international law when it comes to resolving 
issues involving its maritime borders. As such, they felt that the 
international norm to deal with transboundary resources was a 
joint exploitation regime. Then why did they not include such a 
norm in the treaty? The answer was provided by the negotiators 
in the hearing: “among the diplomatic delegation, there were 
some doubts that it could eventually face a constitutional 
challenge.”190 During the time of negotiation of the Treaty of 
2000, the Mexican Constitution forbade any type of association 
with private parties. The only authorized company to exploit 
hydrocarbons was PEMEX. More details regarding the reform  
of the constitutional framework in Mexico will be provided in 
Part VI.A, but suffice it to say now that even if at the time there 
were doubts regarding the possible interpretation of the 
                                               
189. Id. at 7–9 (quoting Ambassador Miguel Ángel González Felix). 
190. Id. at 2 (quoting Ambassador Miguel Ángel González Felix). 
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constitution in the face of a joint exploitation agreement, from 
the international law perspective the Mexican negotiating 
delegation had no doubt that the international rule to follow was 
a joint exploitation agreement. If an international tribunal were 
interpreting the case, all these declarations could serve as a 
basis to prove the opinio juris of the State regarding what the 
customary norm was at the time. 
Finally, it is important to note that the 2000 Treaty did not 
address the existence of shared reservoirs along the rest of the 
1978 maritime boundary. The status of the transboundary fields 
located outside the Western Gap was left unresolved. The only 
applicable rule was that the States could not claim or exercise 
for any purpose sovereign rights or jurisdiction over the seabed 
and subsoil.191 None of the clear and straightforward rules of the 
Western Gap, such as that there shall be no exploitation or 
exploration in the area for ten years, and that the States would 
seek to reach an agreement consistent with principles that  
seek an efficient and equitable exploration, were applicable to 
maritime boundaries outside the Western Gap. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the States were willing to apply the latter principles to 
one portion of the GOM reflected a change of policy and of what 
the international norm was at the time in both States. 
VI.   2012 TRANSBOUNDARY AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Since the Treaty of 2000 delineating the area beyond national 
jurisdiction in the GOM and especially after mild energy reforms 
in Mexico were adopted in 2008, pressure began to build from 
academic and industry circles in both nations to address the 
possibility of transboundary reservoirs along the maritime 
boundary in the GOM.192 At the end of the decade, Mexico and 
                                               
191. See supra Part V.A (discussing the legal status of the reservoirs in the border 
side of the Gulf of Mexico under the 1978 Treaty). 
192. The 2008 energy reform was more modest than the one presented and 
approved in 2013. In fact, the 2008 bill presented by then President Felipe Calderón did 
not include a constitutional amendment nor the possibility of private companies 
participating directly on the exploitation of the oil fields. It mainly contemplated a new 
regulatory regime that would allow better conditions for PEMEX to contract services 
from private parties; it would allow private contracting of refining; give PEMEX a 
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the United States engaged in the most intensive negotiations to 
date on this issue. These negotiations culminated on February 
20, 2012, when the United States and Mexico signed a bilateral 
agreement concerning the joint exploration and exploitation of 
transboundary hydrocarbon structures and reservoirs in the 
GOM that straddle the maritime boundary between the two 
nations.193 Made up of seven chapters and twenty-five articles, 
the Agreement seeks to encourage the establishment of 
cooperative arrangements based primarily on the principles of 
unitization, and leaves open the possibility for the development 
of cooperative agreements outside the framework established in 
the document.194 The application of the 2012 Agreement is 
limited in scope to those transboundary reservoirs that traverse 
the maritime boundary of the two nations and which are entirely 
located beyond nine nautical miles of the coastline of any party 
thereby excluding reservoirs located within the jurisdiction of 
the State of Texas.195 Article 2 defines “Transboundary Reservoir” 
to mean any reservoir which extends across the delimitation line 
that is “exploitable in whole or in part from both sides of the 
delimitation line.”196 The Agreement specifies that if any of its 
provisions require the modification of a U.S. License existing 
before notification of the Agreement’s ratification, then those 
                                               
greater budgetary autonomy; modify the regulatory apparatus to create new federal 
agencies in both the power and hydrocarbon sectors; and finally, adopt federal provisions 
that would allow for the negotiation of transboundary resources agreements with other 
nations. See CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS SOCIALES Y DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA, INICIATIVAS DE 
REFORMA EN MATERIA ENERGÉTICA [ENERGRY REFORM INITIATIVES] (2008), available at 
http://www3.diputados.gob.mx/camara/content/download/184628/441162/file/Iniciativas_
reforma_materia_energetica.pdf. 
193. Agreement Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of 
Mexico, U.S.-Mex., pmbl, Feb. 20, 2012, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/185467.pdf [hereinafter 2012 Transboundary Agreement]. Portions of 
section I are adapted from Miriam Grunstein, Richard McLaughlin, & Luis Anastacio 
Gutiérrez, Gulf of Mexico Offshore Transboundary Hydrocarbon Development: Legal 
Issues Between Mexico and the U.S., HOUS. LAW., Nov./Dec. 2012, at 22, 22–26. 
194. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193. 
195. Id. art. 1. Most U.S. coastal states have been awarded ownership over 
submerged lands extending 3 nautical miles from the coastline. Two exceptions are 
Texas and Florida’s Gulf of Mexico coast, which successfully claimed ownership over nine 
nautical miles. 
196. Id. art. 2. 
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provisions of the Agreement will not apply to that License.197 
Below is a map prepared by the U.S. Congressional Research 
Service in its report of the 2012 Treaty.198 It shows the boundary 
line as agreed in the 2012 Agreement, and consistent with the 
2000 and 1978 Treaties; furthermore, it shows the gap of the nine 
miles of the Texas border and geological features of the seabed. 
 
A.   Ratification Process 
The ratification processes on each side of the border show a 
stark contrast in what the State authorities were expecting about 
the treaty regime as well as which national interests were in 
play. The level of debate that was undertaken by each congress 
with regard to the 2012 Transboundary Agreement is illustrative 
of these contrasting visions. The Mexican Senate spent only a 
few days debating its general terms, without discussing particular 
provisions and avoiding the criticism of the opposition party 
                                               
197. Id. art. 1. 
198. CURRY L. HAGERTY & JAMES C. UZEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43204, 
PROPOSED U.S.-MEXICO TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBONS AGREEMENT: BACKGROUND 
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 12 (2013). 
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(Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD), and the debate was 
heavily dominated by praises by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
which professed that the Agreement would secure Mexico’s 
natural resources from being extracted by the foreign companies 
on the other side of the border.199 On the U.S. side, it took 
almost two years for the 2012 Agreement to be ratified. Debate 
in the United States was focused on the suspected inability of 
Mexico to engage in efficient exploitation practices, the problem 
with the Mexican State-centered regulatory regime, the concerns 
over the ability of PEMEX to be a good partner, and the comments 
from experts on the benefits of the Agreement in case energy 
reform in Mexico was implemented.200 In other words, while in 
Mexico the Agreement was seen as a victory over the abusive 
northern neighbor and the negative aspects of the regime were 
left aside, in the United States there were serious doubts that 
the Agreement could be implemented correctly due to the 
inefficiency of the state oriented policies of Mexico. The debate 
was such in the United States that the Agreement was not 
ratified until Fall of 2013, just days after the Energy Reform in 
Mexico that allows foreign investment in the sector had already 
been approved at the constitutional level.201 
Debate in the Mexican Senate was cursory with just a few 
noteworthy exceptions. For example, Mexican Senator Pablo 
Gómez (PRD) questioned why the minority report that was voted 
                                               
199. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Acuerdo 
Entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos de América Relativo a los 
Yacimientos Transfronterizos de Hidrocarburos en el Gulfo de México [Agreement 
Between the United States Mexicans and the United States of America Concerning the 
Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in Gulf of Mexico] app. 4, available at http:// 
www.sre.gob.mx/images/stories/doctransparencia/rdc/7lby.pdf. 
200. Hearing to Consider the Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement: Hearing on 
S. 812 Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter 
U.S. Senate Hearing 2012 Treaty]. 
201. CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42917, MEXICO: 
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 11 (2014). Also delaying the ratification process was a 
dispute involving provisions to exempt actions taken by public companies in accordance 
with the transboundary hydrocarbon agreement from requirements under Section 1504 
of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Natural Resource 
Extraction Disclosure Rule. CURRY L. HAGERTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43610, 
LEGISLATION TO APPROVE THE U.S.-MEXICO TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBONS AGREEMENT 
2 n.9 (2014). 
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on by the Mexican Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs was 
never presented to the Committee on Energy. He also wondered 
why there was no discussion concerning which authority would 
be assigned as the Executive Authority representing Mexico, the 
National Hydrocarbons Commission (referred to as CNH, the 
Spanish acronym of the autonomous regulatory agency that 
regulates upstream oil and gas operations in Mexico), or more 
directly by the executive branch through the Ministry of 
Energy.202 He also asked what would be the compensation owed 
to Mexico for the fields that are already being exploited that could 
contain transboundary resources or that the 2012 Agreement 
leaves space for unilateral exploitation if the licensees and the 
Parties cannot reach an agreement.203 
                                               
202. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, supra note 199, at 181 (“The document 
that is in the hand of the chair [the Treaty and its legislative report], and that has not 
been read publicly, was never presented in the Senate Committee on Energy. The Senate 
Committee on Energy met and approved the content of the Treaty signed in Los Cabos 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of State of the U.S., without even 
having a legislative report on the matter, without having the Senate Committee that 
first received the Treaty for a resolution present at the hearing, that is the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and North America. A Committee that approves a report that has not 
even been presented is tremendously irregular in our parliamentary practice Mr. 
President of the Chair. How can we approve a report in a session, in a Committee 
session, if the report is not even been written yet? Why is the report so important? 
Because it contains the assessment on the value of the content and substance of the 
Treaty signed by the two governments and that it has been presented for the consent of 
both Congresses. The report must be accompanied by a list of Mexican legislative acts 
that touch on the substance of the Treaty in case its comes into live, because if that 
happens, Mexico must amend its legislative framework to make sure that the Treaty can 
be enforced here. I ask you for example, What would be the role played by the National 
Commission on Hydrocarbons created by the Congress? The PRI approved yesterday a 
parliamentary note asking the Executive to give money to the Commission so that it can 
start functioning. But the Congress is the only one that can give concrete and specific 
powers and tasks to the Commission so that it can administer the Treaty and the 
transboundary fields found in there.”). 
203. Id. at 187 (“In the document that we have just heard about, a number of 
elements of the Treaty are ignored; this Treaty, depends too much on the agreement of the 
licensees, as the Treaty states, the ones assigned by each of the governments and on the 
operator chosen by each one of the licensees. If between them there is no agreement, the 
options for exiting are very few and there is a possibility that a unitization agreement will 
not take place. This means that this Treaty is unique if compared to other treaties, 
because it does not have objective basis, objective legal basis, that necessarily conduct the 
parties to a unitization agreement, this is an important problem, because one of the 
parties could decide to have a policy of not reaching or eluding the unitization practice, 
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On the other side of the political spectrum Senators Rosario 
Green (a former Secretary of Foreign Affairs), Rubén Camarillo 
and Francisco Labastida (the PRI candidate who lost the 2000 
presidential election) defended the Agreement and avoided 
answering Senator Gómez’s questioning. They argued that the 
Agreement was in full conformity with international practice  
by adopting the unitization procedures as the general rule and 
that it was of the highest importance that it be adopted and 
implemented before the moratorium of the 2000 Treaty expired 
in order to avoid exploitation from private companies on the U.S. 
side.204 At the end of the discussion only six Senators commented 
on the Agreement.205 There was no expert present in the hearing, 
and it was ratified by 60 votes in favor, 21 against, and only one 
abstention.206 It was also noteworthy that the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in its Description of the Agreement prepared in lieu of 
the Senate debate mentioned that the Mexican State considered 
unitization the most efficient method to exploit the resources 
and that this complied with international law: 
Adhering to the international practice in those cases 
when there are transborder hydrocarbon reservoirs 
between two or more States, the governments of Mexico 
and the United States decided to adopt the method of 
“unification of reservoirs” (unificación de yacimientos) 
as the proper mechanism for the exploration and 
exploitation of the transborder reservoirs existing 
between both countries, because this mechanism offers 
the best utilization and efficiency of the transborder 
reservoir.207 
                                               
and, consequently, to avoid the joint exploitation of transboundary fields.”). 
204. Id. 187–89. 
205. Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, supra note 199, at 180–96. 
206. Id. at 196–98. 
207. Dictamen de las Comisiones de Relaciones Exteriores, América del Norte y de 
Energía respecto del Acuerdo entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y los Estados Unidos 
de América relativo a los Yacimientos Transfronterizos de Hidrocarburos en el Golfo de 
México [Opinion of the Committees on Foreign Relations, North America, and Energy 
Regarding the Agreement Between Mexico and the United States of America Regarding 
Transboundary Reservoirs of Hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Mexico], GACETA DEL SENADO, 
Apr. 12, 2012, translated in Vargas, supra note 158, at 67. 
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The ratification process on the U.S. side was not as smooth as 
the one in Mexico City. It was highly politicized, and it faced 
difficult negotiations between government branches. The mere 
fact that the Mexican Senate took only three months to ratify the 
2012 Agreement after its signing, and the U.S. Senate took until 
October 2013 to discuss it and the House took until late December 
2013 to adopt federal legislation implementing it, shows a stark 
contrast of the two ratification processes. The congressional 
debate in the United States was mainly focused on the inability 
of Mexico to be an efficient party of the regime, but domestic 
political factors also affected the discussion. One hurdle involved 
a question of transparency in the reporting of oil production 
revenues. Before the Senate had taken up consideration of the 
Agreement, the U.S. House of Representatives in April 2013 
approved a bill (H.R 1613) that would implement the Agreement 
as federal law, but would exclude the obligation under the Dodd-
Frank Act that requires companies to notify and make public all 
payments made to foreign governments.208 The White House 
rejected publicly this proposal and threatened to veto the bill, 
since it would undermine transparency and accountability in 
international energy operations.209 
                                               
208. H.R. 1613, 113th Cong. (2013) (enacted). This House Resolution amended 
Section 32(d) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act with the following language, “(d) 
Exemption From Resources Extraction Reporting Requirement.—Actions taken by a 
public company in accordance with any transboundary hydrocarbon agreement shall not 
constitute the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals for purposes of 
section 13(q) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (157 U.S.C. 78m(q)).” Id. 
209. Executive Office of the President’s Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 
1613—Outer Continental Shelf Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreements Authorization 
Act (June 25, 2013). In this response, the Executive commented on why they could not 
support this bill by stating that: 
[T]he Administration cannot support H.R. 1613, as reported by the House 
Committee on Natural Resources, because of other unnecessary, extraneous 
provisions that seriously detract from the bill. Most significantly, the 
Administration strongly objects to exempting actions taken by public 
companies in accordance with transboundary hydrocarbon agreements from 
requirements under section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s Natural Resource Extraction Disclosure Rule. 
As a practical matter, this provision would waive the requirement for the 
disclosure of any payments made by resource extraction companies to the 
United States or foreign governments in accordance with a transboundary 
hydrocarbon agreement. The provision directly and negatively impacts U.S. 
Do Note Delete 6/1/15  1:50 PM 
752 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37:3 
After months of legislative inaction, in October 2013, the 
Energy Committee of the House of Representatives held a 
hearing on the Agreement and on the discussions in Mexico 
regarding its Energy Reform.210 In the hearing, several experts 
presented encouraging opinions on possible energy reforms in 
Mexico under consideration by President Enrique Peña Nieto, 
and contended that the reforms would ensure the supply of energy 
in North America, would make PEMEX a more reliable partner, 
and would facilitate the implementation of the Agreement. 
Finally, in December 2013, a couple of days after major energy 
reforms were adopted at the constitutional level in Mexico, the 
U.S. Congress and Senate approved the 2012 Agreement as part 
of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013.211 The threat of presidential 
veto was removed, because the final version of the bill did not 
contain any disclosure exceptions to the Dodd-Frank Act. 
B.   Preamble and the Guiding Principles of the 2012 
Transboundary Agreement 
An important aspect of the 2012 Agreement is the 
recognition of some of the principles discussed in previous Parts 
of the study that reflect international practice and the possible 
existence of a binational customary norm between the United 
States and Mexico. The preamble of the Agreement states that 
the intention of the parties during the negotiation of the treaty, 
including the 2000 Treaty, was to establish a “legal framework 
to achieve safe, efficient, equitable and environmentally 
responsible exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs 
that may exist along the maritime boundaries.”212 In the same 
vein, they affirmed that by signing the Agreement the parties 
                                               
efforts to increase transparency and accountability, particularly in the oil, 
gas, and minerals sectors. 
Id. 
210. U.S. Senate Hearing 2012 Treaty, supra note 200. 
211. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-67, 127 Stat. 1165 (providing 
in div. A, title III, section 303, that “The Agreement between the United States of 
America and the United Mexican States Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon 
Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico, signed at Los Cabos, February 20, 2012, is hereby 
approved”); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1356b (2012). 
212. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193. 
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are recognizing the “principles that promote equitable and 
reasonable utilization of transboundary resources, and desiring 
to maximize the long term benefits from their exploitation, as 
well as to protect the resources of both Parties.”213 The recognition 
that these are the guiding principles of the Agreement has 
particular legal effects for its interpretation because they reflect 
the object and purpose of the Agreement. As noted in the Vienna 
Convention on Treaties, the parties, the institutions created by 
the Agreement and any future tribunals are bound to interpret 
it in light of these principles.214 In practice, this can have 
important effects for the negotiation of particular contracts 
between the licensees or the States: any legal agreement, be that 
a licensee from a government to exploit a field or a joint venture 
between companies, that deals with the way a transboundary 
field is to be exploited must try to maximize the exploitation  
of the resources in a safe, equitable and environmentally 
responsible way. How do you identify the most efficient method 
for exploiting the resources? How do you measure efficiency, or 
an environmentally responsible method? Would efficiency be 
related in terms of the best interest of the State or in terms of 
the best commercial interest of the licensees? What would 
happen if a method of exploitation is efficient in economic terms, 
but it is less environmentally responsible or if its safety protocols 
are dubious? How would a tribunal or the institutions created by 
the Agreement answer these questions? These questions are not 
resolved by the text of the Agreement. It is important to note 
that in the offshore energy industry what might be considered 
efficient to the State might not be considered as such by an 
international consortium of oil companies, as exemplified by the 
words of Judge Jessup in the North Sea Case: 
                                               
213. Id. 
214. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 336 [hereinafter Vienna Convention of 1969] (“A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). Consequently, the preamble 
of the Transboundary Agreement explaining the object of the treaty and the goals that 
the Parties tried to achieve when they signed it is the guiding principle of interpretation. 
See id. 
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 It has been stated that “the oil industry is strictly 
international” and in many of the explorations in the 
continental shelf in the North Sea the interests of one 
petroleum company are not confined to a single 
national sector and are frequently blended in a group or 
consortium which may contain as many as a dozen 
separate companies. The same drilling rigs, barges or 
platforms are chartered to operate first in one national 
sector and then in another. 
. . . . 
 However, the interests of the petroleum companies are, 
of course, not identical with those of the Governments 
of the several States. The latter are concerned with the 
national revenue to be derived from fees, taxes, royalties 
or profit-sharing, with increases in national productivity, 
and also with the impact on the national balance of 
payments if imports of fuels to meet domestic needs are 
eliminated or reduced by the production of natural gas 
in the State’s portion of the continental shelf.215 
The parties to the 2012 Agreement, by not providing a 
specific definition of the terms listed in the preamble—efficient, 
equitable, environmentally responsible—have left the terms open 
to interpretation, and consequently leave open the possibility 
that the regime could develop in an unexpected way that affects 
the interests of one or both States. This is important to note 
particularly considering that Mexico and the United States have 
different understandings of the nature of these resources: for 
Mexico these are property of the State and they should be 
exploited in a way that maximizes the profit for the government; 
in the United States they are resources that should be exploited 
by private parties in the most efficient way that benefits the 
citizens of the United States and ensures the efficient supply  
of energy to the United States under a national security 
paradigm.216 
                                               
215. N. Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 79 (Jessup, J., concurring). 
216. Outer Continental Shield Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (describing the 
broad range of environmental, safety, economic, and national security goals of the 
statute). 
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Despite these potentially destabilizing features, the 2012 
Agreement provides a valuable framework for the two nations to 
move forward when transboundary hydrocarbons are located. As 
mentioned in Part V that described the 1978 and 2000 Treaties, 
it took more than thirty-four years for the United States and 
Mexico to come to terms in the way both nations were to going to 
handle the issue of transboundary resources in the Gulf of 
Mexico. All this despite the fact that they had already a well-
settled binational practice that dealt with water resources along 
the terrestrial border. For this reason, even with the described 
ambiguities and difficulties that will be explained below, the 
2012 Agreement is a step forward in U.S.-Mexico relations. 
C.   Reporting Requirements and Information Sharing 
Article 4 of the 2012 Transboundary Agreement sets up 
several reporting requirements for activities conducted near the 
maritime boundary. Generally, written notice must be provided 
if either party is aware of the existence of a transboundary 
reservoir or if a licensee has submitted an exploration plan 
within three nautical miles of the boundary.217 If a licensee has 
submitted a plan for “Development” or “Production” of an area 
within three miles of the boundary, parties must go beyond just 
a written notice and must provide the plan to the other party.218 
D.   Determining the Existence and Allocation of a Transboundary 
Reservoir 
Article 5 sets up the framework for determining whether a 
transboundary reservoir exists. The Agreement requires the 
parties to consult each other in order to determine the existence 
of a transboundary reservoir and to share geological information 
provided for by their licensees which may be relevant to the 
determination of whether a transboundary reservoir exists.219 In 
case the parties fail to reach an agreement on the existence of a 
transboundary reservoir, this Article, in conjunction with others, 
                                               
217. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 4(2). 
218. Id. art. 4(2)(f). 
219. Id. arts. 4(2)(a), (d), 5(1). 
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sets up the framework in which the determination may be made 
by a Joint Commission220 or Expert Determination.221 
E.   Unitization 
Chapter 2 deals with the exploration and exploitation of  
a transboundary reservoir or unit and it is here that the 
Agreement’s emphasis on the principle of unitization is explained. 
Article 6 requires that any joint exploration or exploitation of a 
transboundary reservoir pursuant to a unitization agreement 
must be approved by both the United States and Mexico, with the 
possibilities that one or both governments make recommendations 
to the agreements before they are approved. The designated 
agencies of the States must develop one or more unitization 
agreement models that can be used by the licensees in their 
negotiation.222 In both the models and the approved agreements, 
the executive agencies will have to compare the guiding 
principles of the agreement with the substantive rights contained 
in the particular agreements. In the event that the executive 
agencies cannot reach a consensus for the approval of the 
agreements after a particular period of time, the agreements are 
to be considered as rejected by the States.223 In addition, the 
executive agencies are required to make a joint determination 
estimating the amount of recoverable hydrocarbons in the 
transboundary reservoir and the allocation on either side of the 
maritime boundary.224 Along with this estimate the parties will 
have to jointly determine the associated allocation of production225 
and in the event the executive agencies are unable to reach this 
                                               
220. Id. art. 5(2). 
221. Id. art. 14(6). 
222. Id. art. 6(1) (“The Executive Agencies should develop one or more model 
unitization agreements for use under this Agreement.”). 
223. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 6(4) (“Each Executive 
Agency shall approve, approve with modifications or reject the proposed unitization 
agreement within 120 days of its receipt. Either Executive Agency may extend this 
period, provided that the total additional period for consideration shall not exceed 120 
days. If after the end of the latest period applicable for consideration by an Executive 
Agency either Executive Agency has not approved, approved with modifications, or 
rejected the proposal, the unitization agreement shall be deemed to be rejected.”). 
224. Id. art. 7(2)(b). 
225. Id. 
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determination, the question will be submitted to expert 
determination.226 
Although it highly encourages unitization, it is possible 
under the Agreement for a licensee to proceed with exploitation 
of a transboundary reservoir without having to unitize. If either 
of the parties does not approve a licensee’s unitization proposal 
or if any licensee fails to sign a unitization agreement after it 
has been approved, then either nation may authorize its licensee 
to proceed with the exploitation of the reservoir.227 The non-
unitizing licensee however, will, among other things, still be 
subject to the determination of allocation of production mentioned 
above and required to share production data on a monthly 
basis.228 Regardless of this requirement, there is no explicit 
obligation in the Agreement to share the profits of the exploited 
resources in case the licensee proceeds unilaterally with the 
exploitation of the reservoir. The same situation is present for 
those fields that were already licensed before the Agreement 
was ratified. In case the existent licensee determines that the 
fields that it had been exploiting for the period prior to the 
Agreement contains transboundary resources, there is no 
obligation to compensate the State or the other licensee for the 
already exploited resources. The inclusion of a compensation 
clause in this type of agreements is not rare, for example the 
Agreement Between the Netherlands and Germany of 1971 states 
in the section related to transboundary resources that “[i]f any 
mineral resources have previously been extracted from the deposit 
extending across the boundary, the regulations shall also include 
provisions for appropriate compensation.”229 Nevertheless, the 
2012 Agreement is silent on this. 
Redetermination of the allocation of production on a fair and 
equitable basis is provided pursuant to an approved unitization 
agreement or by separate agreement, if no unitization agreement 
                                               
226. Id. art. 7(3). 
227. Id. art. 7(5). 
228. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 7(5). 
229. Treaty Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North 
Sea, Neth.-Ger., art. 2(2), Jan. 28, 1971, 857 U.N.T.S. 12296 [hereinafter Netherlands-
Germany Treaty]. 
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has been approved.230 Consequently, each State must include in 
their license agreements a chapter related to unitization. The 
way the licenses are assigned on each side of the border, 
particularly the fiscal regime applicable to it, will have an 
impact in the negotiation of the unitization agreements. If, for 
example, on one side of the border the royalties to be paid to the 
government X are fixed regardless of sudden increases on the 
price of oil, but on the other side of the border the potential 
unitization partner has a royalty rate that can be increased 
yearly depending on the price of oil, the business model, return 
rate and production plans of each company can be diametrically 
different. Consequently, it will affect the way they negotiate the 
unitization agreement. 
In this regard, it is important to note some aspects that the 
2013 energy reform in Mexico bring to the negotiation table of 
the licensees that face a transboundary resource and potential 
unitization negotiation. According to the 2013 reform private 
companies can only exploit deepwater fields in Mexican territory 
by signing four types of contracts with the government: joint 
production, profit sharing, license and service contracts.231 In 
each of these contracts the royalties, taxes, bonuses, national 
content and exploration fees are different.232 It is up to the 
Ministry of Energy to determine in each field, which type of 
contract will be the most appropriate one in terms of the benefit 
that it will yield to the State.233 Furthermore, the rate of the 
royalty depends on the price of barrel, it is determined on a yearly 
basis, and there is an adjustment mechanism in case there is 
extraordinary profitability of a particular field.234 All these factors 
are determined and controlled by another governmental entity, 
                                               
230. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, arts. 7(5), 9. 
231. See Energy Reform Could Increase Mexico’s Long-Term Oil Production by 75%, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail. 
cfm?id=17691. 
232. See MAYER BROWN, ANALYSIS OF MEXICO’S NEW HYDROCARBONS LEGAL REGIME 
3, 5–6 (2014), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/69fe7acd-ca5b-
4d1c-a172-31678b13ec06/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/75b0fe83-d4a2-4523-b8e2-
3f7ae78102a7/UPDATE-Analysis-of-Mexicos-New-Hydrocarbons-Legal-Regime.pdf. 
233. Ley de Hidrocarburos [Law of Oil], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 
[DO], 11 agosto de 2014, section II, art. 16 [hereinafter National Hydrocarbons Law]. 
234. Negroponte, supra note 17. 
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the Ministry of Finance.235 Finally, the reform forces the Ministry 
of Energy to impose a minimum of 20% of participation of PEMEX 
in any project that has the potential of having a transboundary 
field or that ends up having one.236 Consequently, at least on the 
Mexican side of the border, the private licensee must also 
negotiate with PEMEX and then engage with the licensee on the 
U.S. side. Unitization agreements are complex on their own and 
the regulatory framework, at least from the Mexican side, does 
not make them any easier. 
F.   Fiscal Regime 
The Agreement states that each licensee will pay the 
corresponding amount of taxes as determined by the State that 
authorized the exploitation of the fields. In other words, the 
percentage of royalties and other taxes paid by the Mexican or 
the American licensed company will be determined by the 
license agreement that each one has from their governments. 
Consequently, the profits of a particular field could be different 
depending on the fiscal regime that each company is subject to. 
As mentioned above using the example of the Mexican energy 
reform, this will impact the negotiation of the unitization 
agreement drastically. A company with a higher royalty by one 
of the sides will have a more delicate business plan and less space 
to negotiate a unitization agreement with the other company. 
This affects directly the incentives from each side to negotiate 
an agreement. The fiscal regime of each licensee will have to 
consider this fact in order to attract particular investments in 
the deepwater fields of the borderline. 
G.   Cooperation and Facilitating Access to Facilities 
The 2012 Transboundary Agreement calls for parties to 
facilitate cooperation between the licensees in carrying out the 
exploration and exploitation of a Transboundary Unit,237 which 
                                               
235. National Hydrocarbons Law, supra note 233, art. 30. 
236. Id. art 17. 
237. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 12(1)–(2). The definitional 
section in Article 2 states that “Transboundary Unit” means “a single geological 
Hydrocarbon structure or Reservoir which extends across the Delimitation Line the 
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includes facilitating access to pipelines and facilities near the 
maritime boundary for those workers participating in activities 
related to the Transboundary Unit.238 Provisions facilitating 
cooperation near the delimitation line significantly enhance 
opportunities for U.S. and Mexican business collaboration far 
beyond the six statutory miles on either side of the maritime 
boundary that defines a “Transboundary Reservoir.” In fact, the 
Agreement requires the two nations, in the area extending fifteen 
statute miles on either side of the boundary, to use “best efforts” 
to facilitate cooperation and “not impede such cooperation by 
unreasonably withholding necessary Permits.”239 Article 12 is an 
especially important incentive for cooperation for a couple of 
reasons. First, the obligation of the governments to use “best 
efforts” to facilitate cooperation has specific legal meaning that 
requires the obligation to be completed in a diligent manner that 
is stronger than a mere “good faith” obligation.240 This means 
that businesses operating within fifteen miles of either side of 
the boundary that are incidental to a “Transboundary Unit” will 
be provided with preferences in governmental assistance and 
permitting. Second, these governmental preferences should 
provide an incentive to actually engage in exploration and 
exploitation of transboundary reservoirs pursuant to a unitization 
agreement as opposed to developing reservoirs in other deepwater 
areas located outside of the three-mile boundary zone subject to 
the Transboundary Agreement.241 Importantly, in the case of 
                                               
entirely of which is located beyond 9 nautical miles from the coastline, approved by the 
Executive Agencies for joint Exploration and/or Exploitation pursuant to the terms of a 
unitization agreement.” Id. art. 2 “Transboundary Unit”. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. José Luis Herrera Vaca, The New Legal Framework for Oil and Gas Activities 
Near the Maritime Boundaries Between Mexico and the U.S.: Comments on the 
Agreement Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America 
Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico, 5 J. WORLD 
ENERGY L. & BUS. 235, 243 (2012) (explaining the value of Article 12 in enhancing 
cooperation between Mexico and the United States and “serving as a model for 
cooperation in other parts of the world”). 
241. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 12(1) (providing that the 
parties use “best efforts to facilitate cooperation between Licensees in activities related 
to the Exploration and Exploitation of a Transboundary Unit”). The language used 
implies that the preferences will only be granted to those facilities that are specifically 
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Mexico, the new energy reform created an agency, the Energy 
Regulatory Commission, that, among other powers related to 
hydrocarbon, has the duty to regulate the use of the existing 
pipelines for the benefit of the private companies. Currently this 
agency is not the executive agency designated by Mexico and 
leaves open the possibility of an inter agency dispute on how  
to enforce this particular section of the agreement without 
contradicting domestic legislation. 
H.   Dispute Resolution 
The Agreement also establishes mechanisms for resolving 
disputes, more specifically a Joint Commission, arbitration and 
expert determinations. The Agreement establishes the Joint 
Commission as the competent body that will examine any dispute 
or matter referred to it by the executive agencies relating to the 
interpretation and implementation of the Agreement.242 The Joint 
Commission is a permanent body composed of one representative 
and one alternate representative from the United States and 
Mexico.243 It is important to note that the composition of the 
Joint Commission prevents it from being an autonomous, 
impartial or, as in the case of the IWBC inland, a commission 
with the nature of a bilateral international organization. Each 
party not only designates one representative, without stating 
particular qualifications of the members, but the Agreement also 
states that each party has to cover the expenses of their 
respective representative. Hence, the Commission, in principle, 
depends completely on the executive authorities to operate and 
the impartiality of its members is not secured. This is an 
important aspect to note, since it is the Joint Commission that  
is the designated authority to interpret and implement the 
Agreement provisions.244 It is somewhat surprising that the 
                                               
engaged in assisting the Transboundary Units located within three statute miles of the 
border. By implication, facilities that are operating within fifteen miles that are not 
specifically related to the Transboundary Units will not receive the preferences. 
242. Id. art. 14(5). 
243. Id. art. 14(2). 
244. Id. art. 14(5) (“The Joint Commission shall be the competent body to examine 
any dispute or other matter referred to it by either Executive Agency relating to the 
interpretation and implementation of this Agreement, or any unforeseen issues arising 
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parties did not create a body with an independent nature, or 
even one where a final decision could be secured, since by 
designating only one member from each side, in case of an 
impasse there is no other mechanism in the Commission to come 
up with a final decision on the correct interpretation of the 
Agreement. The likely reason to adopt this approach to dispute 
settlement is that it allows the two nations to retain political 
control over the exploitation of resources within their sovereign 
territory. In fact, it may have been felt that relinquishing 
government control to a less biased dispute settlement body 
would have made domestic political approval of the 2012 
Agreement impossible to achieve. Regardless of the reasons 
behind the makeup of the Joint Commission, in a sector where 
large transnational companies are politically influential in both 
States, a commission with this type of composition and 
characteristics is problematic in ensuring that the Agreement 
will be implemented and interpreted effectively. 
In addition to the Joint Commission, the Agreement 
encourages consultations between the two parties, and allows for 
nonbinding mediation. If disputes are not resolved through 
consultations or mediations and are not resolvable through expert 
determinations pursuant to the Agreement, either party may 
choose to refer the dispute to arbitration pursuant to Article 
17.245 
The details of arbitration are left to the Joint Commission to 
decide.246 The fact that the rules for determining the arbitration 
procedure are left unresolved, that it does not mention the 
number of arbitrators, and more importantly that the parties did 
not give their express consent to arbitrate and that the decision 
is to be considered as final, is a noteworthy fact due to its 
atypical nature in comparison with international practice. For 
example, the Agreement states that “either Party may submit 
the dispute to arbitration” (“cualquiera de las partes podrá 
someter la controversia a arbitraje” in the Spanish version),247 
                                               
under this Agreement.”). 
245. Id. art. 15(2). 
246. Id. art. 17. 
247. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 17. 
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instead of using the traditional wording of other treaties, “shall 
be submitted” (Iceland-Norway Treaty and Timor Gap Treaty) 
that leave no doubt on the binding character of an arbitration 
proceeding.248 In the same vein, the international practice is to 
state that the award will be final and binding on the parties 
(“An award shall be final and binding on Australia and Timor-
Leste”)249 (“The decision of the tribunal shall be binding”) (Timor 
Gap Treaty)250 (Iceland-Norway Treaty) (Netherlands-Germany 
Treaty) (“The Parties shall abide by any award made by the 
arbitration board under this article”) (Japan-Korea Treaty).251 
Regarding the selection of arbitrators and the procedure, other 
agreements, such as the UK-Norway Agreement are very 
detailed: 
 If any such dispute cannot be resolved in this manner 
or by any other procedure agreed to by the two 
Governments, the dispute shall be submitted, at the 
request of either Government, to an Arbitral Tribunal 
composed as follows: 
 Each Government shall designate one arbitrator, and 
the two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, 
who shall be the Chairman and who shall not be a 
national of or habitually reside in the United Kingdom 
or in the Kingdom of Norway. If either Government 
fails to designate an arbitrator within three months of a 
request to do so, either Government may request the 
President of the International Court of Justice to 
appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply 
                                               
248. Compare id., with Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 142, art. 30, and Agreement 
Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits, Nor.-Ice., art. 5, Nov. 3, 2008, U.N.T.S. 
No. 50378, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/ 
50378/Part/I-50378-0800000280321996.pdf [hereinafter Iceland-Norway Treaty]. 
249. Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste relating to the Unitization of the Sunrise and 
Troubadour Fields, Austl.-Timor-Leste, Annex IV, Mar. 6, 2003. 
250. Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 142, annex C § 12.5 (“The decision of a majority 
of the arbitrators shall be final and binding.”). 
251. See Iceland-Norway Treaty, supra note 248 (“The decisions of the tribunal 
shall be binding upon the Parties.”); Netherlands-Germany Treaty, supra note 229,  
art. 5(6) (“The decision [of the tribunal] shall be binding.”); Japan-Korea Treaty, supra 
note 141, art. 26 (“The Parties shall abide by any award made by the arbitration board 
under this article.”). 
Do Note Delete 6/1/15  1:50 PM 
764 HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37:3 
if, within one month of the designation or appointment 
of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not 
been elected. The Tribunal shall determine its own 
procedure, save that all decisions shall be taken, in  
the absence of unanimity, by a majority vote of the 
members of the Tribunal. The decisions of the Tribunal 
shall be binding upon the two Governments and shall, 
for the purposes of this Agreement, be regarded as 
agreements between the two Governments.252 
                                               
252. Agreement Relating to the Exploitation of the Frigg Field Reservoir and the 
Transmission of Gas Therefrom to the United Kingdom, art. 28(2), U.K.-Nor., May  
10, 1976, 1098 U.N.T.S. 16878 [hereinafter UK-Norway Agreement]. The same type of 
provision was included in article 5 of the Netherlands-Germany Agreement of 1971: 
(1) Disputes between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Treaty or any regulations adopted pursuant to article 2, 
paragraph (2), shall so far as possible be settled by negotiation. 
(2) Any dispute which is not settled in this manner within a reasonable time 
shall, at the request of either Contracting Party, be referred to an arbitral 
tribunal for decision. 
(3) The arbitral tribunal shall be constituted on an ad hoc basis. Save where 
the Contracting Parties, in accordance with a simplified procedure, appoint 
by mutual agreement a single arbitrator to resolve the dispute, an arbitral 
tribunal composed of the three members shall be constituted in the 
following manner:  
  Each Contracting Party shall appoint a member, and the two members 
shall agree on a national of a third State, who shall be appointed 
chairman by the two Contracting Parties. 
  The members must be appointed within two months, and the chairman 
within a further two months after either Party has requested that the 
dispute should be resolved by an arbitral tribunal. 
(4) If the time-limits referred to in paragraph (3) above are not met, either 
Contracting Party may request the President of the International Court of 
Justice to make the necessary appointments. If the President is a national 
of one of the Contracting Parties or is incapacitated for any other reason, 
the appointments shall be made by the Vice-President. If the Vice-President 
also is a national of one of the Contracting Parties or is incapacitated,  
the appointments shall be made by the next most senior member of the 
Court who is not a national of one of the Contracting States and is not 
incapacitated. 
(5) The arbitral tribunal shall take its decisions by majority vote. Each 
Contracting Party shall bear the costs of its member and of its 
representation in the arbitral proceedings; the cost of the chairman and 
the remaining costs shall be borne by the Parties equally. 
(6) The arbitral tribunal or the single arbitrator shall reach a decision on the 
basis of the international law applicable between the Contracting Parties. 
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In contrast with these international practices, the 2012 
Agreement is silent regarding the condition of the arbitral 
award, the procedure to initiate the arbitration and the consent 
of the States to arbitrate the dispute. As stated above, the only 
mention to the arbitration proceeding is located in the section of 
the powers of the Joint Commission and leaves to it the 
obligation to adopt the rules for the initiation of an arbitration 
proceeding.253 This weakens the implementation of the 
Agreement. Even if the Joint Commission is successful in 
designing adequate rules for the arbitration proceeding, a hard 
task in itself considering its institutional weaknesses mentioned 
above, the award could be subject to a legal challenge in both 
jurisdictions. The legislative bodies that ratified the Agreement 
did not approve a particular arbitral system, nor did they accept 
that the award will be binding on the States. This is an important 
issue, particularly with respect to the United States since, 
according to the U.S. Supreme Court, decisions from international 
judicial bodies that emanate from binding international treaties 
can be an international law obligation, but they do not 
“automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in 
United States courts.”254 Federal legislation giving the judicial 
                                               
The decision shall be binding. 
(7) The arbitral tribunal or the single arbitrator shall determine its or his own 
procedure, save as otherwise provided in this Treaty or by the Contracting 
Parties at the time of constitution of the arbitral tribunal or appointment 
of the single arbitrator. 
Netherlands-Germany Treaty, supra note 229, art. 5; see also Japan-Korea Treaty, supra 
note 141, art. XXVI (providing other rules for arbitration). 
253. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 17 (“The Joint 
Commission shall, within 180 days of the adoption of its rules of procedure, establish an 
arbitration mechanism for the implementation of this Article.”). 
254. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504 (2008) (“Medellín first contends that 
the ICJ’s judgment in Avena constitutes a ‘binding’ obligation on the state and federal 
courts of the United States . . . . No one disputes that the Avena decision—a decision that 
flows from the treaties through which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction 
with respect to Vienna Convention disputes—constitutes an international law obligation 
on the part of the United States. But not all international law obligations automatically 
constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts. The question we 
confront is whether the Avena judgment has automatic domestic legal effect such that 
the judgment of its own force applies in state and federal courts . . . . Because none of 
these treaty sources [the Treaty, the Optional Protocol, the UN Charter and the ICJ 
Statute] created binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and 
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decision direct domestic legal effect would be necessary so that 
“the judgment of its own force applies in state and federal 
courts.”255 Consequently, in a controversial case there is always 
the chance that a U.S. licensee could argue that the domestic 
institutions, like the U.S. Department of Interior, are not subject 
to implement an award from a tribunal constituted under the 
2012 Treaty, regardless of its international effects, and that a 
legislative action would be needed in order for the award to be 
binding domestically.256 
In the same spirit of contradicting international practice the 
agreement suggests that any arbitration decision will not be 
final and binding since, “The Joint Commission will have 30 
days in which to consider the final recommendation in any 
arbitration instituted pursuant to Article 17. If the Joint 
Commission is unable to resolve any remaining differences 
within that time, the dispute will be returned to the parties.”257 
The possibility of stalemate was clearly envisioned by the parties 
given the makeup of the Commission with one representative 
from each nation and no opportunity for a tie-breaking vote. 
As is customary in oil and gas contracts, the Agreement calls 
for expert determinations in settling certain disputes. It leaves 
to the Joint Commission many of the details regarding how 
these determinations will work in actual practice. However, it 
does set up a temporary mechanism for expert determinations 
and describes what issues may be submitted to such 
determination.258 One of the most interesting aspects concerning 
expert determinations is that unlike arbitration, they shall be 
considered final and binding on the parties.259 The likely reason 
                                               
because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena 
judgment is not automatically binding domestic law.”) (emphasis in original). 
255. Id. 
256. See generally Jordan J. Paust, Medellín, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, 
and Relevant Executive Authority, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 301, 301–02 (2008) 
(discussing the relevance of Medellín for the supremacy of international treaties in the 
United States); Margaret McGuinness, Three Narratives of Medellín v. Texas, 31 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 227, 230–31 (2008) (discussing the relevance of Medellín 
from various perspectives). 
257. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 14(7). 
258. Id. art. 16. 
259. Id. art. 16(9). 
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for this is that the binding expert determination is limited to 
narrowly focused technical issues such as determining whether 
a transboundary reservoir exists260 and what the allocation of 
production should be for each party.261 Decisions relating to 
whether production should or should not occur and broader more 
discretionary aspects of the unitization process are left to the 
Joint Commission or non-binding arbitration. 
I.   Texas Border 
As mentioned above, the Transboundary Agreement does 
not apply to areas within the first nine nautical miles of the 
coastline.262 It is noteworthy that according to U.S. legislation 
these miles are precisely the ones belonging to the States of the 
union, and not the Federal Government.263 Hence, the resources 
located there, if they happen to be transboundary, are property 
of the state of Texas and it is up to this authority to decide how 
to negotiate their exploitation with the Mexican State. An 
interesting phenomenon arises, what would be the legal status 
of this type of agreement according to international law or 
domestic law? The Vienna Convention of 1969 is clear in stating 
that a treaty means “an agreement concluded between States in 
                                               
260. Id. art. 14(6). 
261. Id. art. 7(3). 
262. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 1 (“This Agreement 
shall apply to cooperation between the Parties with regard to the joint Exploration and 
Exploitation of geological Hydrocarbon structures and Reservoirs that extend across the 
Delimitation Line, the entirety of which are located beyond 9 nautical miles from the 
coastline.”). 
263. See Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (2012): 
The term “boundaries” includes the seaward boundaries of a State or its 
boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico or any of the Great Lakes as they existed at 
the time such State became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved 
by the Congress, or as extended or confirmed pursuant to section 1312 of this 
title but in no event shall the term “boundaries” or the term “lands beneath 
navigable waters” be interpreted as extending from the coast line more than 
three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more 
than three marine leagues into the Gulf of Mexico, except that any boundary 
between a State and the United States under this subchapter or subchapter II 
of this chapter which has been or is hereafter fixed by coordinates under a 
final decree of the United States Supreme Court shall remain immobilized at 
the coordinates provided under such decree and shall not be ambulatory. 
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written form and governed by international law” and that a 
nation “may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”264 Would Texas 
be representing the United States in such an Agreement? If so a 
constitutional question would arise under U.S. law since, only 
the President can sign treaties with the consent and approval of 
the Senate.265 In fact the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized 
that the treaty making powers of the President extend to all 
proper subjects of negotiation with foreign governments.266 The 
legal status of the Mexico-Texas Treaty would be dubious and 
subject to legal challenge domestically. On the other hand, if 
Texas by signing the Treaty is not representing the United 
States, then what would be the status of an agreement signed 
between a U.S. state and another sovereign nation if Article 1, 
section 10, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution states that “No 
State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation”? 
According to the Supreme Court, the term “treaty” must be 
construed in its broadest terms, meaning that the desire of the 
framers was that “there would be no occasion for negotiation  
or intercourse between the state authorities and a foreign 
government.”267 But, some commentators suggest that an 
                                               
264. Vienna Convention of 1969, supra note 214, arts. 2(1)(a), 27. 
265. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.”). The U.S. Supreme Court has 
ruled several times that the treaty making powers of the President are not limited in 
subject matter by the Constitution. See, e.g., Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 
(1931) (“The treaty-making power is broad enough to cover all subjects that properly 
pertain to our foreign relations.”). In the same vein, the Restatement (Third) states that 
“[c]ontrary to what was once suggested, the Constitution does not require that an 
international agreement deal only with ‘matters of international concern.’ . . . The 
United States may make an agreement on any subject suggested by its national interests 
in relations with other nations.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 66, § 302, cmt c. 
266. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). 
267. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575–76 (1840) (“Every part of [the 
Constitution] shows, that our whole foreign intercourse was intended to be committed  
to the hands of the general government . . . . It was one of the main objects of the 
Constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one 
nation; and to cut off all communications between foreign governments, and the several 
state authorities.”); see also Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty 
Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV 403, 506–07 (2003) (“[B]eginning with Chief Justice Taney’s 
tour de force in Holmes v. Jennison, the Supreme Court has read the Constitution  
as proscribing such negotiations in the absence of national supervision—even though 
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agreement between a state and a sovereign nation would be valid 
constitutionally if it had the approval of Congress.268 On the 
other hand, according to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law “[w]hat distinguishes a treaty, which a State 
cannot make at all, from an agreement or compact, which it can 
make with Congressional consent, has not been determined. 
That would probably be deemed a political decision.”269 The issue 
seems to be unresolved in U.S. law. It is not clear yet that there 
are transboundary units in that section of the border, but the 
possibility is latent and the 2012 Agreement did not solve the 
situation, rather leaving it open to future action. 
J.   Inspections 
The Agreement allows for inspections by both parties of 
their respective offshore facilities.270 The details of when these 
inspections may take place, under what circumstances, and 
what procedures are to be used are not specified in the 
Agreement, and further regulation and bilateral negotiations in 
this matter will be necessary for adequate implementation. The 
agreement does, however, set up a unique procedure in which 
inspectors from one country can request that the other party 
cease activities in case of emergencies where there is a risk of 
loss to life, serious bodily injury or damage to the environment.271 
As far as the authors are aware, this is the only instance 
globally in which the inspectors from one nation can temporarily 
                                               
precedent suggest that there is no such bar in pursuing interstate compacts. Second, in 
contracts to the case-by-case approach followed with respect to interstate compacts, 
foreign compacts appear always to pose a sufficient risk to federal supremacy to warrant 
congressional consent. That position has not always been respected, but the deviations 
have enjoyed no constitutional sanction.”). 
268. See Swaine, supra note 267, at 507–08 (“These reins [prohibition to celebrate 
foreign compacts] upon the states, however, are once again entrusted to the national 
political branches. As with interstate compacts, Congress appears to exercise 
unreviewable discretion over the approval of their foreign brethren. As an empirical 
matter, Professor Henkin has observed, ‘[n]o agreement between a state and a foreign 
power has been successfully challenged on the ground that it is a treaty which the state 
was forbidden to make.’”). 
269. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 66, § 302, cmt. f. 
270. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 18(1). 
271. Id. art. 18(5). 
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halt operations taking place in the sovereign territory of another 
nation. This provision was undoubtedly driven in response to 
events associated with the Macondo oil spill that occurred in the 
Gulf of Mexico shortly before the negotiations began on the 2012 
Transboundary Agreement. 
K.   Safety and Environmental Protection 
Article 19 of the Agreement contains rather broad language 
concerning safety and environmental protection. It is somewhat 
insufficient as it does not establish any specific environmental  
or safety regulations and instead provides general language 
about adopting common standards “where appropriate” and 
requirements whose adequacy and compatibility are yet to be 
determined.272 As is recurrent in this Agreement, it leaves 
specific procedures for the implementation of common standards 
of safety and environmental protection for later development  
by both nations’ respective lawmakers or administrative 
agencies.273 Regardless of the aspirational rather than binding 
quality of these provisions, the Agreement does call on the two 
nations to adopt “common safety and environmental standards,” 
which may serve as the foundation for broader cooperation  
in the GOM and other ocean areas.274 This section of the 
Agreement did not contemplate any contingency fund in case an 
oil spill happens. In the past, both nations have faced this type 
of challenge before, most notably the Ixtoc spill by PEMEX on 
the Mexican side and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill by British 
Petroleum on the U.S. side.275 A stable and efficient regime 
                                               
272. Id. art. 19(1). 
273. Id. art. 19(2). 
274. Id. art. 19(1). 
275. See generally James M. West, Comment, The Ixtoc I Oil Spill Litigation: 
Jurisdictional Disputes at the Threshold of Transnational Pollution Responsibility, 16 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 475 (1981) (discussing the Ixtoc I oil spill and resulting international legal 
disputes); Jacqueline L. Weaver, Offshore Safety in the Wake of the Macondo Disaster: 
Business as Usual or Sea Change?, 36 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 147, 153 (2014) (discussing U.S. 
changes in offshore drilling in response to the British Petroleum oil spill). It should be 
noted that in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the U.S. government and 
the offshore hydrocarbon industry have made a number of significant changes to its 
regulations and practices in an attempt to prevent future spills. See Caroline Haquet, 
Macando: The Disaster That Changed the Rules, TECHNICAL NEWSL. (SCOR Global P&C, 
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regarding safety and environmental protections should include a 
contingency plan in case something unexpected happens in the 
joint exploitation fields. It should be remembered in this regard 
that Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration states: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations and the principles of international law, 
their sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.276 
This principle has been recognized in 1996 by the ICJ in the 
Advisory Opinion of the Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear 
Weapons as a customary norm of international law, hence it is 
binding both on Mexico and the United States in their relations 
concerning the exploitation of shared resources.277 
L.   Termination 
The Agreement sets forth that it can be terminated either  
by mutual agreement or by either country at any time via 
written notice within a specified time period.278 Highlighting the 
importance that both nations place on managing transboundary 
hydrocarbon resources, the Agreement provides that in the 
event of termination the two nations must begin consultations  
to develop a new agreement addressing transboundary 
reservoirs.279 
                                               
Paris, France), Apr. 2014, for a summary of these changes. 
276. U.N. Conf. on the Human Env’t, June 5–16, 1972, Principle 21, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14Rev.1 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. 
277. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 29 (July 8) (“The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to 
the environment.”). 
278. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 23(1). 
279. Id. art. 23(3). 
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VII.  IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2012 TRANSBOUNDARY 
AGREEMENT 
The signing of the 2012 Transboundary Agreement was the 
result of a decades long series of diplomatic efforts by the two 
nations, including three bilateral treaties that delineated the 
maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mexico.280 U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary R. Clinton summarized the key objectives of the 
2012 Transboundary Agreement at the signing ceremony, in 
which she reaffirmed the guiding principles of the regime: 
[T]oday we are . . . following through on the commitment 
that Presidents Calderon and Obama made in 2010  
to improve energy security for both countries and to 
ensure a safe, efficient, responsible exploration of the  
oil and gas reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico . . . . These 
[transboundary] reservoirs could hold considerable 
reserves that would benefit the United States and 
Mexico alike. But they don’t necessarily stop neatly at 
either of our maritime boundaries, which could lead to 
disputes that would then interfere with our countries 
and companies doing the hard work of discovering what 
is available to us. If a reservoir straddles the boundary, 
then there would be disputes over who should do  
the extraction and how much they should extract. The 
agreement we sign today helps prevent such disputes. 
It also helps promote the safe, efficient, and equitable 
exploration and production of cross-boundary reservoirs. 
Each country maintains its own right to develop its own 
resources.281 
Thus, the Agreement was clearly intended to establish a 
legal regime that balances bilateral and international concerns 
over the safe, efficient, and equitable development of 
transboundary resources while maintaining each nation’s 
                                               
280. See supra Part V (discussing the 1978 and 2000 Treaties); see also Treaty to 
Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River 
as the International Boundary, U.S.-Mex., art. V, Nov. 23, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 371 
(establishing the maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico). 
281. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks at the Signing of the 
U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Agreement (Feb. 20, 2012); see also supra Part VI.B 
(discussing the guiding principles of the 2012 Transboundary Agreement). 
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sovereign right to develop its own natural resources as each sees 
fit. In light of the fact that the resources in question are shared 
and transboundary, some practices that are taken pursuant to 
the Agreement may give rise to concerns as to whether it fully 
complies with principles of international law. In the absence of 
compliance, it will be difficult to predict whether it constitutes a 
valid and solid legal framework, which potentially provides 
certainty and stability for the development of transboundary 
hydrocarbon reservoirs in the Gulf of Mexico. 
The following Subparts analyze the 2012 Transboundary 
Agreement in the context of the international principles applied 
to shared natural resources. First, it summarizes how the 
Agreement leads the parties to potentially reach a unitization 
agreement; second, it examines how the Agreement allows the 
parties to exploit the transboundary reservoir if a unitization 
agreement cannot be reached; and last, it assesses whether the 
Agreement complies with international law. 
A.   The 2012 Transboundary Agreement Unitization Process 
The 2012 Transboundary Agreement commits the Parties  
to develop their shared natural resources in a safe, efficient, 
equitable and environmentally responsible manner, based 
primarily on principles of unitization to protect the resources of 
both parties and to maximize the long term benefits from their 
exploitation.282 Therefore, the conduct of the Parties and the 
interpretation and implementation of the 2012 Agreement should 
be inferred in light of these principles. 
Bearing these principles in mind, the first relevant provision 
set forth in the 2012 Agreement is the right/duty to consult on 
exploration and exploitation activities carried out within three 
statute miles of the delimitation line,283 including the exchange 
of all relevant and available geological information, as well the 
duty to notify.284 In addition to formal actions relating to agency 
                                               
282. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193. 
283. Id. art. 4(1). 
284. Id. art. 4(2). The duty to notify is triggered if either Party is aware of the 
likely existence of a transboundary reservoir or hydrocarbon occurrence near the 
delimitation line; it has approved, or its Licensee has submitted for approval, a plan for 
the collection of seismic data or an exploration plan; either party is aware of a 
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approval or permitting, the right/duty to consult extends 
whenever “either Party is aware of a Hydrocarbon Occurrence at 
or near the Delimitation Line.”285 Hydrocarbon Occurrence at or 
near the Delimitation Line is defined as “a detection of 
Hydrocarbons during drilling operations within 3 statute miles 
on either side of the Delimitation Line.”286 Any triggering event 
requires the Parties287 to consult to determine whether a 
transboundary reservoir exists.288 If a determination cannot be 
reached, the issue may be submitted to the Joint Commission.289 
The determination whether a transboundary reservoir exists 
is a critical issue in the sense that it will determine which 
nation, or both, has the right to explore and exploit the resource. 
In other words, it will determine whether the development of 
that particular reservoir will be submitted to the legal regime  
of the 2012 Agreement (if it is transboundary in nature) or 
developed exclusively by the nation in which sovereign territory 
it is located (if it is not transboundary). 
The process of consultation to determine whether a 
transboundary reservoir exists shall be initiated within thirty 
days of the receipt of a communication of the occurrence of any 
relevant event.290 However, the parties may not have enough 
data to make an informed decision at this point. In fact, it  
may take years until a determination can be made. Before a 
determination is made, the licensees are not obligated to enter 
into any type of unitization agreement. Because both nations are 
parties to the 2012 Agreement, during any interim period prior 
to a determination of the existence of a transboundary reservoir, 
the basic principle regarding the observance of international 
                                               
“Hydrocarbon Occurrence”; either party’s Licensee has submitted a plan to drill a well; 
and/or any Licensee has submitted a plan for the development or production. Each 
occurrence has a different timeframe in which the party shall notify the other. Id. 
285. Id. 4(2)(d). 
286. Id. art. 2, “Hydrocarbon Occurrence near the Delimitation Line.” 
287. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 5(1) (requiring that the 
parties consult through their Executive Agencies within thirty days following receipt of 
communication noting a triggering event). 
288. Id. 
289. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 5(2). 
290. Id. art. 5(1). 
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agreements pacta sunt servanda applies.291 This establishes an 
obligation to act in good faith and to not engage in conduct with 
a view to undermining a party’s duties under the treaty. 
Accordingly, neither nation should move forward to develop the 
resource until a good faith determination is made. 
On the other hand, once it is determined that a transboundary 
reservoir exists, the parties shall endeavor to take all efforts to 
reach an agreement on the joint development of a transboundary 
reservoir or Unit Area,292 primarily through unitization.293 
Alternatively, the parties may agree on another kind of 
cooperative arrangement also based on efficient, equitable, and 
environmentally responsible principles.294 Each party shall take 
steps to facilitate exploitation of the transboundary reservoir as 
a transboundary unit.295 Neither party may commence production 
until all attempts to negotiate a unitization agreement put 
forward in the Agreement are exhausted.296 
It is suggested that the parties develop one or more model 
unitization agreements in accord with the terms of the 2012 
Agreement to be used as a template by its licensees.297 In any 
event, the terms of the unitization agreement shall be negotiated 
and proposed by the licensees and approved by the parties 
within 120 days of its receipt, extendable only once for the same 
period. The parties may refer any issue regarding the unitization 
                                               
291. See JANIS, supra note 87, at 27 (explaining how pacta sunt servanda 
developed and is applied under international law). The term pacta sunt servanda is an 
accepted principle of customary international law and also finds its place in article 26 of 
the Vienna Convention on Treaties where it is defined as “every treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Id. 
292. “‘Unit Area’ means the geographical area described in a Transboundary Unit, 
as set out in the unitization agreement.” 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 
193, art. 2. 
293. Id. art. 7(1). “Unitization” refers to a process in which separate interest 
owners in a common oil and gas reservoir pool such interest to form a single unit under 
the sole operation of a single operator who conducts unit operations for all so that 
maximum efficient recovery is accomplished and production and/or revenues there may 
be shared out in accordance with the agreed basis established in the unit plan. Onorato, 
supra note 28, at 332–33. 
294. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193. 
295. Id. art. 7(1). 
296. Id. 
297. Id. art. 6(1). 
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agreement to the Joint Commission, as needed, for the remaining 
period.298 More generally, should a unitization agreement be 
proposed, the parties shall require the licensees to enter into a 
unit operating agreement.299 The parties shall require their 
licensees to submit an executed unit operating agreement prior 
to the approval of the unitization agreement. 300 A key provision 
that shall be included in the unitization agreement is the 
methodology used to calculate the allocation of production.301 
The parties shall require the unit operator to initiate 
consultations on the allocation of production to each side of the 
delimitation line.302 In case an agreement cannot be reached, the 
matter shall be referred to expert determination or submitted to 
the Joint Commission depending on the circumstances.303 
Two potentially contentious issues relating to domestic 
legislation on each side of the border emerge out of this treaty 
provision that need further clarification. The one related to the 
U.S. side was recently raised by energy consultant George 
Baker. He points out that under U.S. law, a licensed block  
for purposes of hydrocarbon production is defined in two 
dimensions. In a particular square or rectangular block, the 
lease owner has commercial mineral rights for deposits at any 
depth. Consequently, the lease block owner has mineral rights 
to one reservoir which may be located in a geologic formation 
10,000 feet below the seabed as well as another that is located in 
                                               
298. Id. art. 6(4). 
299. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 11(1) (“Each Executive 
Agency shall require its Licensees to enter into a Unit Operating Agreement . . . in 
accordance with this Agreement.”); see also id. arts. 7(4)–(5) (setting forth procedures of 
when no unitization agreement has been approved at the end of the required period or if 
any party or licensee fails to sign a unitization agreement); id. art. 2 (defining “unit 
operating agreement” as “an agreement made between the Licensees and the unit 
operator that, among other things, establishes the rights and obligations of the Licensees 
and the unit operator including, but not limited to, the allocation costs and liabilities 
incurred in and benefits derived from operations in the Unit Area”). Unit operating 
agreements are signed only by the licensees to govern the actual operation of the unit. 
Weaver & Asmus, supra note 33, at 17. 
300. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 11(2). 
301. Id. art. 6(2)(c). 
302. Id. art. 8(1) (requiring this consultation to be initiated at least 60 days prior to 
the commencement of production). 
303. Id. art. 7(6). 
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a different portion of the lease block that may be located at 
20,000 feet depth.304 However, according to the definitional 
terms of the 2012 Transboundary Agreement, for purposes of 
unitization, each cross-border “reservoir” should be the object of 
a separate unitization agreement.305 It is currently unclear how 
this definitional discrepancy will be addressed. We can only 
speculate whether this issue could present practical problems in 
crafting future unitization instruments or instead is of primarily 
theoretical concern. Much will depend on how strictly the parties 
or third party dispute settlement bodies interpret the requirement 
for a separate unitization agreement for each reservoir.306 There 
is no explicit language in the Agreement requiring separate 
unitization agreements for each reservoir, as opposed to a broader 
multi-reservoir agreement, nor is there language explaining the 
specific rights a leaseholder may be entitled to exercise. These 
ambiguities will need to be examined and addressed as part of 
any proposed implementing regulations. 
The second issue arises on the Mexican side. As mentioned 
above in Part VI.A above according to the Mexican energy 
reform legislation and its secondary regulations, the role of the 
government in administrating the exploitation of hydrocarbons 
fields is divided between different agencies. On the one hand, 
the Ministry of Energy is the entity designated to identify the 
blocks that are to be open for private participation and those 
that should remain under the control of PEMEX;307 to prepare 
                                               
304. George Baker, Panel Presentation on the US-Mexico Transborder Hydrocarbon 
Agreement, U.S. ASS’N FOR ENERGY ECON., http://dialogue.usaee.org/index.php/volume-
21-number-1-2013/28-panel-presentation-on-the-us-mexico-transborder-hydrocarbon-
agreement (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
305. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 2 (defining “reservoir” 
as “a single continuous deposit of Hydrocarbons in a porous and permeable medium, 
trapped by a structural or stratigraphic feature”). The 2012 Transboundary Agreement 
also defines a “transboundary unit” as “a single geological Hydrocarbon Structure or 
Reservoir which extends across the Delimitation Line.” Id. 
306. This issue is not unique to the 2012 Agreement. One study of eleven sample 
unitization agreements from different parts of the world found seven were limited to 
specified reservoirs or depths, two had no depth limitations, and two could not be 
categorized due to insufficient information. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 33, at 75. 
307. Ley de Hidrocarburos [Law of Oil], as amended Diario Oficial de la Federación, 
[DO], 11 agosto de 2014 (Mex.), art. 6, translated in Hydrocarbons Law, MAYER BROWN, 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/uploads/Documents/PDFs/2015/January/UPDATE-
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the draft contracts that will be assigned to each block (they  
can be production sharing, profit sharing, licensees or service 
contracts);308 and to require unitization agreements when the 
licensees or PEMEX face straddling fields.309 On the other hand 
it is the National Hydrocarbons Commission that is in charge of 
preparing the report on the capacities of PEMEX to develop the 
fields;310 on establishing the existence of straddling reservoirs;311 
on designing and executing the bidding process for the blocks;312 
and most importantly, on signing the contracts with private 
parties to develop the fields.313 An additional complexity is added 
by the fact that the Ministry of Finance participates in the 
determination of the royalties, taxes and other fiscal 
responsibilities that are to be included in the contracts.314 Hence, 
the complexity of coordination between the three agencies is key 
in the development of the model contracts that have to be 
drafted and the contracts that will be approved by the State 
Agencies according to the 2012 Transboundary Agreement. The 
position taken by the Mexican State regarding the negotiation of 
these unitization agreements will depend on the interaction of 
the three State entities. One cannot make decisions without the 
other intervening at some stage. 
Finally, the National Hydrocarbons Law includes an article 
on transboundary resources that forces the licensee, once  
there is a report from the National Hydrocarbons Commission 
confirming its existence, to “migrate” the contract into an 
association with PEMEX, where the latter must have at least 
20% participation.315 This article creates a very complex 
relationship, because under the 2012 Agreement the company 
                                               
HydrocarbonsLaw_Translation.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2015) [hereinafter National 
Hydrocarbons Law]. 
308. Id. art. 18. 
309. Id. art. 42. 
310. Id. arts. 12, 23. 
311. Id. art. 17 (stating that the National Hydrocarbons Commissions gives 
technical assistance to the Ministry of Energy in determining possible cross-border 
deposits). 
312. National Hydrocarbons Law, supra note 307, arts. 15, 23. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. arts. 13, 24, 29, 30. 
315. Id. art. 17. 
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licensed by the Mexican government has then two obligations at 
hand: under the Agreement it must engage in unitization 
negotiations with the U.S. licensee on the other side of the 
border, and at the same time according to Mexican legislation it 
must sign an association agreement with PEMEX giving at least 
20% of participation to the state-owned company. To complicate 
matters even further, at the same time it must receive the 
approval from both governments in the terms of the contract, 
with the risk that if the negotiation fails or if the State 
representatives reject the unitization agreement, the U.S. party 
could start operations in the field. 
B.   When a Unitization Agreement Cannot Be Reached Does 
International Law Restrict the Ability of the Parties to Still 
Exploit the Transboundary Resource? 
If the States do not approve, approve with modification or 
reject a proposal for unitization of a specific field, the unitization 
agreement shall be deemed to be rejected.316 The same procedure 
applies to any amendment to an approved unitization 
agreement.317 Importantly, as previously explained, in the  
case where a transboundary reservoir exists but a unitization 
agreement has not been approved, the Agreement stipulates 
that the parties shall refrain from commencing production 
during the period in which they are attempting to reach a 
unitization agreement.318 
In this circumstance, the parties shall take steps to pursue an 
agreement requiring its licensee to submit a proposed unitization 
agreement and associated unit operating agreement.319 Moreover 
the parties shall jointly determine an estimate of the recoverable 
hydrocarbons in the transboundary reservoir on each side of  
the delimitation line and jointly determine the allocation of 
production.320 If the parties cannot agree on an allocation of 
                                               
316. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 6(4). 
317. Id. art. 6(5). 
318. Id. art. 7(1). 
319. Id. art. 7(2)(a). 
320. Id. art. 7(2)(b). 
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recoverable hydrocarbons, the matter shall be referred to binding 
expert determination. 321 
The parties have 90 days to approve one of the proposed 
unitization agreements or an alternate unitization agreement 
and unit operating agreement.322 If an agreement cannot be 
reached by the end of the period, the issue shall be referred to 
the Joint Commission for its consideration. 323 
In the end, there is no requirement that the parties approve 
the unitization agreement or unit operating agreement. The 2012 
Transboundary Agreement contains a multitude of procedures 
intended to foster compromise and consensus between the parties. 
However, it is still possible that an agreement may not be 
reached. In such a case, the 2012 Transboundary Agreement 
allows the parties to authorize their licensees to proceed with 
exploitation of the relevant transboundary reservoir.324 The 
authority to exploit is conditioned on the existing determination 
of the recoverable hydrocarbons, the application any existing 
plan for joint management of the transboundary reservoir, and 
the exchange of production data on a monthly basis.325 Even 
considering these conditions, the provision allowing either 
nation to exploit the resource in the absence of a mutually 
accepted unitization agreement is unique and unlike other 
transboundary hydrocarbon agreements in effect globally. By 
contrast, similar treaties governing the development of offshore 
transboundary reservoirs establish the duty to mutually refrain 
from exploitation activities until the unitization agreement is 
executed. 
Examples include the recent Treaty Between the Kingdom  
of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime 
Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic 
Ocean.326 Under the terms of this agreement, if the parties fail  
                                               
321. Id. arts. 7(3), 16(9). 
322. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 7(4). 
323. Id. 
324. Id. art. 7(5). 
325. Id. 
326. Treaty Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea 
and the Arctic Ocean, Nor.-Russ., Annex II, art. 1(8), Sept.15, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 1113 
(stating that parties have an obligation to refrain from permitting production without a 
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to approve a unitization agreement, they have six months to 
negotiate a settlement.327 If the disagreement is not settled within 
six months either party is entitled to submit the dispute to an ad 
hoc Arbitral Tribunal whose decision shall be binding on the 
parties.328 
Another example is Article 21 of annex B of the Treaty 
Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of 
Cooperation in an Area Between the Indonesian Province of East 
Timor and Northern Australia, which requires approval by the 
Joint Authority before production may begin. The relevant 
provision reads as follows: 
Where a petroleum pool is partly within a contract area 
and partly within another contract area, but wholly 
within Area A, the Joint Authority shall require the 
contractors to enter into a unitization agreement with 
each other within a reasonable time, as determined by 
the Joint Authority, for the purpose of securing the 
more effective and optimized production of petroleum 
from the pool. If no agreement has been reached within 
such reasonable time, the Joint Authority shall decide 
on the unitization agreement. Without limiting the 
matters to be dealt with, the unitization agreement 
shall define or contain the approach to define the 
amount of petroleum in each contract area, the method 
of producing the petroleum, and shall appoint the 
contract operator responsible for production of the 
petroleum covered by the unitization agreement. The 
Joint Authority shall approve the unitization agreement 
before approvals under Article 17 of this Petroleum 
Mining Code are given. Any changes to the unitization 
agreement shall be subject to approval by the Joint 
Authority. 329 
An additional example is presented in Articles 14 and 15  
of the Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of the Sudan and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia Relating to the Joint Exploitation of the Natural 
                                               
jointly-approved unitization agreement). 
327. Id. art. 3(1). 
328. Id. 
329. Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 142, art. 21. 
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Resources of the Seabed and Subsoil of the Red Sea in the Common 
Zone, which provides the following: 
In the event that any accumulation or deposit of a 
natural resource extends across the boundary of the 
exclusive sovereign rights area of either Government 
and the Common Zone, the Joint Commission shall 
determine the manner in which it is to be exploited 
provided that any decision taken shall guarantee for 
the Government involved an equitable share in the 
proceeds of the exploitation of such accumulation or 
deposit. 
If a dispute arises respecting the interpretation or 
implementation of this Agreement or the rights and 
obligations it creates, the two Governments shall seek to 
settle such dispute by amicable means. If the settlement 
of the dispute through amicable means fails, the dispute 
shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice. 
The Parties accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice in this respect. If one of 
the two Governments takes a measure which is objected 
to by the other, the objecting Government may ask  
the International Court of Justice to indicate interim 
measures to be taken to stop the measure objected to or 
to allow its continuance pending the final decision. 330 
A final illustration is presented in the transboundary 
unitization agreement between Norway and the United Kingdom 
in the Frigg Field Reservoir.331 Article 2(3) addresses the issue of 
what should occur if the field is ready for production but the two 
national parties have not yet agreed on apportionment or other 
factors. Rather than delay the flow of revenues, pending 
agreement, production is to proceed on the provisional basis of 
the licensees’ proposal on apportionment or on the basis of equal 
shares.332 If the Governments fail to agree then the matter is 
referred to the dispute settlement procedures, which include a 
                                               
330. Agreement Relating to the Joint Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the 
Sea-Bed and Subsoil of the Red Sea in the Common Zone, Saudi Arabia-Sudan, arts. 
XIV, XVI, May 16, 1974, 952 U.N.T.S. 197. 
331. UK-Norway Agreement, supra note 252, art. 2(3). 
332. Id. 
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Conciliation Board whose decisions are binding on the parties.333 
Under these provisions, while production can move forward even 
without agreement on apportionment or other matters, it  
must be done pursuant to provisional shared production and 
compulsory third party dispute settlement. 
None of these selected treaties authorizes the parties to 
proceed with unilateral exploitation of transboundary reservoirs 
in case a dispute arises. In all of the examples, if a unitization 
agreement cannot be agreed upon, the parties submit the dispute 
to some form of compulsory third party dispute settlement  
body for final decision. In light of these illustrations of existing 
State practice and given the unique features of the 2012 
Transboundary Agreement regarding the possible unilateral 
exploitation of a shared transboundary resource, we now turn to 
consider whether the 2012 Transboundary Agreement could give 
rise to practices that are inconsistent with international law. 
C.   Is the 2012 Transboundary Agreement Inconsistency with 
International Law? 
The process of negotiating and signing an international 
agreement encompasses an intricate balancing of legal, technical, 
diplomatic, strategic and political considerations. Some 
combination of these factors caused the United States and 
Mexico to include paragraph 5 of Article 7 in the Agreement, 
which allows either nation to proceed with exploitation activities 
in case a unitization agreement cannot be reached. 
It is well established in international customary law that 
nations have an obligation to prevent activities that may cause 
damage to the legitimate rights and interests of other States.334 
Thus, as previously discussed, in the international arena the 
so-called rule of capture has been rejected as both wasteful  
and inequitable.335 Instead, international law recognizes that 
neighboring States sharing transboundary hydrocarbon resources 
                                               
333. Id. art. 28(2). 
334. Zhiguo, supra note 104; see also Stockholm Declaration, supra note 276, 
Principle 7 (indicating that States “shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of 
the seas” that interferes with other legitimate uses of the sea). 
335. See supra Part III.B (discussing the rule of capture); see also McLaughlin, 
supra note 7, at 9 (explaining why international law has rejected the rule of capture). 
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have the duty to negotiate in good faith to attempt to adopt 
certain cooperative mechanisms to jointly develop such 
reservoirs.336 In the absence of such an agreement, there is a 
generally recognized obligation to exercise mutual restraint with 
respect to the unilateral exploitation of the resources337 in order 
to preserve the unity of the deposit and ensure its efficient 
exploitation.338 
In summary, the principles of international law concerning 
the exploration and exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon 
reservoirs, as applicable to the 2012 Transboundary Agreement, 
can be summarized as: 1) the parties have the duty to notify, 
inform and consult regarding any activities in the delimitation 
area; 2) the parties have the duty to negotiate in good faith some 
sort of joint mechanism to develop the reservoir, preserving the 
unity of the deposit; and 3) in case a unitization agreement or 
other acceptable method cannot be reached, the parties have the 
duty to refrain from unilaterally exploiting the transboundary 
reservoir to the detriment of the sharing party.339 
While the 2012 Transboundary Agreement seems clearly  
to conform with the first two principles of international law 
stated above, the specific provision that allows the parties to 
authorize its licensees to proceed with unilateral exploitation of 
a transboundary reservoir if a unitization agreement cannot  
be reached goes beyond what is traditionally observed in 
international treaties and requires careful analysis. 
It is well established that nations such as the United States 
and Mexico may supersede an international customary rule 
through an inconsistent bilateral agreement such as the 2012 
                                               
336. See supra Part III.D (discussing how international law is moving toward 
recognizing a duty of States to cooperate in the development of shared natural 
resources). 
337. Ong, supra note 25, at 802. 
338. See supra Part III (describing the intricate balance of the physical and 
geological characteristics of a reservoir, which determines the development plan for the 
optimal recovery of hydrocarbons); see also N. Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 81 
(Jessup, J., concurring). 
339. See supra Part III.D (discussing that the established international norm does 
not limit parties that share a transboundary hydrocarbon reservoir to engage in only 
certain types of joint exploitation, such as unitization, but rather they must elect a 
method which cannot be done to the detriment of the sharing party). 
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Transboundary Agreement.340 Because the agreement to exploit 
a transboundary reservoir in the absence of an approved joint 
unitization agreement is bilateral and will not damage a third 
party nation, Mexico and the United States should be entitled to 
override the customary rule and exploit the resource as each 
nation sees fit.341 However, this finding assumes that each nation 
as well as their respective licensees are fully satisfied with how 
the neighboring nation interprets and implements the 2012 
Agreement. If the neighboring nation objects to unilateral 
exploitation of a transboundary field, could that nation rely on 
international customary law to challenge the implementation of 
the 2012 Agreement? 342 
The starting point for determining the precise parameters of 
an international agreement’s obligation is the exact wording of 
the agreement.343 The 2012 Transboundary Agreement contains 
a complex series of procedures intended to encourage bilateral 
consensus and compromise. Of special importance is the provision 
that provides authority for either party to proceed with 
exploitation in the absence of a unitization agreement. Article 7 
(5) reads: 
Should any party or licensee fail to sign a unitization 
agreement or unit operating agreement, as applicable, 
approved by the executive agencies or the joint 
commission within 60 days of its approval, or should 
the executive agencies or the joint commission fail to 
approve a unitization agreement and an associated unit 
                                               
340. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 66, § 102 cmt. j (“Unless the parties evince 
a contrary intention, a rule established by agreement supersedes for them a prior 
inconsistent rule of customary international law.”). 
341. Vienna Convention of 1969, supra note 214, art. 34 (“A treaty does not create 
either obligations or rights for a third state without its consent.”). 
342. The issue may also be relevant if the transboundary field is located along the 
maritime boundary in the Western Gap region beyond national jurisdiction. Unlike Mexico, 
because the United States is not a party to UNCLOS and has not submitted its extended 
continental shelf claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for review, 
it will not gain the sanctity and legitimization yielded by a positive recommendation by 
this body. The full legal ramifications of this scenario are unclear, but it is likely that the 
U.S. and Mexican governments, along with any associated private sector lessees, are 
subject to a less stable and riskier legal environment in the Western Gap, than elsewhere 
in the GOM. 
343. Vienna Convention of 1969, supra note 214, art. 31. 
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operating agreement, each party may authorize its 
licensee to proceed with exploitation of the relevant 
transboundary reservoir subject to the determination of 
the recoverable hydrocarbons pursuant to paragraph 2 
subparagraph b or paragraph 3 of this article and any 
plan for joint management of the transboundary 
reservoir, including any provisions agreed governing 
redetermination and metering, as may be agreed 
between the parties. Such plan may contain provisions 
for the resolution of disputes pursuant to article 16. In 
the event of such exploitation, parties will exchange 
production data on a monthly basis.344 
In short, pursuant to this provision, if a unitization 
agreement cannot be reached, but there is a determination that 
a transboundary reservoir exists, each party may authorize: a) 
its licensee to proceed with exploitation subject to the previously 
agreed upon allocation of production and; b) any plan for joint 
management of the transboundary reservoir. 
It is particularly relevant here to interpret the wording of 
Article 7 (5) to grasp the full extent and legal effects of this 
provision. It is significant to note that it uses the modal verb 
“may.” As a result, the parties may authorize their licensees to 
proceed with exploitation or they may not choose to do so. It may 
seem obvious, but it emphasizes that it is a discretionary power 
of the parties to authorize exploitation. 
It is also important to recollect that the parties are bound by 
two sets of international legal frameworks: the first set is 
comprised of established norms of public international law, and 
the second by the terms of the 2012 Transboundary Agreement 
itself. In this context, the Agreement must be interpreted in line 
with, and supplemented by, recognized international principles 
applied to the exploration and exploitation of transboundary 
hydrocarbon reservoirs.345 
                                               
344. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 7(5). 
345. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 66, § 102 n.4 (“A subsequent agreement will 
prevail over prior custom, except where the principle of customary law has the character 
of jus cogens, but an agreement is ordinarily presumed to supplement rather than to 
replace a customary rule.”) (emphasis added). 
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Consequently, Article 7 (5) of the 2012 Agreement should be 
interpreted as it was written: the parties have the discretionary 
power to authorize exploitation, even if a unitization agreement 
cannot be reached, inasmuch as they deem appropriate and if the 
result of such activity will not “cause damage to the legitimate 
rights and interests” of other sovereign nations, otherwise it 
would seem that the 2012 Agreement endorses the rule of 
capture, prohibited by international law.346 
Another significant point concerning the wording of  
Article 7 (5) is the fact that, by using the connective “and” (“each 
Party may authorize its Licensee to proceed with Exploitation . . . 
and any plan for joint management of the Transboundary 
Reservoir”)347 it conditioned the authorization to proceed with 
exploitation on the approval of a joint management plan. It is 
not authorizing one exploitation or the other plan. Instead, if the 
party authorizes the exploitation, it must authorize the joint 
management plan as well. This interpretation is in line with the 
plain meaning and principles governing the 2012 Transboundary 
Agreement, safe, efficient, and equitable exploitation of 
transboundary maritime reservoirs. Moreover, such a plan shall 
be subsumed to the determination made by the parties or by the 
binding determination by an expert on the estimate of the 
recoverable hydrocarbons in the transboundary reservoir on 
each side of the delimitation line and the allocation of 
production.348 
                                               
346. UNCLOS, supra note 25, arts. 77(1)–(2) (rejecting the rule of capture, 
signatories agreed not to allow exploitation of the natural resources in a coastal state’s 
continental shelf zone without the state’s permission, even if the state itself does not 
explore for or produce the recoverable resources). 
347. 2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 7(5). 
348. If a unitization agreement has not been approved, the 2012 Transboundary 
Agreement article 7, paragraphs 2 and 3 provide the following: 
[2]a. Each Party shall require its Licensee, within 60 days, to submit a proposed 
unitization agreement and associated Unit Operating Agreement to each 
Executive Agency; and 
[2]b. The Executive Agencies shall, within 30 days, jointly determine an estimate 
of the recoverable Hydrocarbons in the Transboundary Reservoir, under 
the original conditions of such Reservoir, on each side of the Delimitation 
Line, and jointly determine the associated allocation of production. 
3. If the Executive Agencies are unable to reach the determination set out in 
paragraph 2 subparagraph b of this Article, such determination shall be 
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In light of these conditions, the right of each party to 
authorize exploitation of a transboundary reservoir must be 
interpreted and exercised preserving the rights and interests of 
the other nation in such a manner as to protect the resources of 
both parties, to maximize the long-term benefits from their 
exploitation, and to allocate production accordingly. In practical 
terms, a party may not authorize its licensees to proceed with 
exploitation of a transboundary reservoir if both parties or a 
binding third-party expert determination has not approved a 
detailed development plan for the exploration and exploitation of 
the unit area, including the estimated number and timing of 
wells and a mechanism for delivery and approval of subsequent 
changes to such plan.349 This plan, based on technical criteria, 
determines the optimal strategy to develop the shared reservoir. 
If it is decided unilaterally, the other party could allege the 
neighboring nation damaged the unity of the deposit, thereby 
violating established international legal principles. 
Lastly, Article 7 (5) establishes the duty to exchange 
production data on a monthly basis. By no means do the terms 
of the Agreement support the rule of capture. Rather, they 
establish a comprehensive process in which the parties may 
proceed to reach an agreement regarding unitization. In case an 
agreement is not reached and exploitation is authorized, the 
Agreement must be interpreted in line with international 
principles mandating production in a safe, efficient, equitable 
and environmentally responsible manner. The provisions 
allowing each nation to authorize its licensees to proceed with 
exploitation in the absence of a unitization agreement were 
undoubtedly intended to accommodate domestic political interests 
in each nation. However, in reality, the parties will still need to 
cooperate and abide by the determinations of jointly selected 
                                               
referred to Expert Determination. 
2012 Transboundary Agreement, supra note 193, art. 7(2)–(3). In addition, article 16, 
paragraph 9 states that this determination “shall be final and binding on the parties.” 
Id. art. 16(9). 
349. See id. art. 6(2) (listing these and other details that must be included in the 
licensee’s proposed unitization agreements and allocation of production plans submitted 
to the executive agencies or subject to binding Expert Determination under article 7, 
paras. 2–3). 
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experts on technical issues if either seeks to produce hydrocarbons 
from a transboundary reservoir in the delimitation area. 
Consequently, the Agreement seems to be in conformance with 
established international legal principles relating to the 
exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon resources. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined the large and varied sources of 
international law including UNCLOS,350 customary international 
law,351 the decisions of international tribunals,352 existing joint 
exploitation agreements,353 and U.S./Mexico bilateral practice on 
transboundary resources354 to better understand the international 
legal implications associated with developing hydrocarbon 
resources in the maritime boundary region of the GOM. From  
all of these sources taken together, it can be inferred that  
the progressive development of international customary law 
establishes an obligation to cooperate in reaching agreement on 
the exploration and exploitation of transboundary deposits 
pending delimitation of the maritime boundary between adjacent 
or opposing States, but is less clear where there is a delimited 
maritime boundary. In situations, such as those that exist along 
the established maritime boundary between the United States 
and Mexico in the GOM, the parties have a duty to negotiate in 
good faith to attempt to adopt certain cooperative mechanisms 
to jointly develop shared reservoirs and an obligation to exercise 
mutual restraint with respect to the unilateral exploitation of 
the resources in order to preserve the unity of deposit.355 Existing 
international law also emphasizes the need to exploit shared 
resources in the most “efficient” way, and treating the reservoir 
as one unit achieves that goal. Furthermore, bilateral practice of 
these two nations has shown that in order to achieve the above-
mentioned principles when facing common pool resources, they 
                                               
350. See supra Part III.B. 
351. See supra Part III.D. 
352. Id. 
353. See supra Part III.E. 
354. See supra Part IV. 
355. See supra Part III.D. 
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have relied on the creation of binational commissions. These 
commissions tend to include technical experts, with a level of 
independence, and with enough powers to determine the most 
effective way for developing the resources. The most pertinent 
example of such a commission is the International Waters and 
Boundaries Commission that has operated since 1944 with high 
levels of effectiveness considering the disparity of influence and 
power between both nations. When this commission was created, 
Mexico and the United States were innovating and setting a new 
standard in international practice; in the case of the relatively 
weak commission created by the 2012 Transboundary Agreement 
one can only conclude that it is the opposite. 
We have also examined the landmark 2012 Transboundary 
Hydrocarbon Agreement between the United States and Mexico 
and whether the provisions in the Agreement that allow the 
parties to unilaterally exploit transboundary reservoirs in the 
absence of an approved unitization agreement are compatible 
with existing principles of international law. A provision allowing 
unilateral exploitation of transboundary reserves and without 
referral to an authoritative dispute settlement mechanism 
diverges from international practice as guided by international 
law; every international transboundary hydrocarbon agreement 
that we have studied requires the parties to submit the dispute 
to some form of compulsory third party dispute settlement body 
for final determination. After analyzing the relevant provisions 
in detail, including the preambular language of the Agreement, 
we conclude that a party may not authorize its licensees to 
proceed with exploitation of a transboundary reservoir in the 
absence of a detailed development plan that has been approved 
by both parties. This plan is based on technical criteria and 
determines the optimal strategy to develop the shared reservoir. 
If it is decided unilaterally, the other party could allege the 
neighboring nation damaged the unity of the deposit, thereby 
violating established international legal principles. The 
requirement that a joint development plan be in place before 
unilateral exploitation is allowed, coupled with mandatory 
exchange of production data on a monthly basis, signifies that 
the parties intended that the process fall in line with established 
international principles mandating production in a safe, efficient, 
equitable, and environmentally responsible manner. 
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Article 7 (5), which allows each nation to proceed with 
unilateral exploitation in the absence of a unitization agreement 
was undoubtedly influenced by perceived negative domestic 
political considerations attached to any international legal 
document that would allow another nation or third-party 
arbitrator to decide when and how resources would be exploited 
within each nation’s territory. These considerations, while 
understandable, do not obviate the need of both nations to 
cooperate and implement the 2012 Transboundary Agreement so 
that it conforms with established international legal principles. 
There is every reason to believe that whether a particular 
transboundary reservoir is developed through an approved 
unitization agreement or in the absence of one, that all work will 
comply with internationally accepted norms. 
All of the above elements might also be a consequence of the 
negotiating realties that the diplomats at the time faced. It 
seems that the negotiating parties were working under the 
assumption that the Mexican legal regime that maintained a 
monopoly on PEMEX in exploiting hydrocarbons in the Mexican 
side of the GOM at the time would not be changing in the short 
run. Therefore, the parties were reluctant to establish a provision 
that would halt production until a final unitization agreement 
would have been reached (as the international practice requires), 
forcing foreign companies to sign an agreement with what was 
presumed to be an inadequate partner at that time, PEMEX. It 
is important to remember that the negotiations of the Agreement 
began in 2000 and ended in 2012. During that period, the 
Mexican legal regime and the political atmosphere in Mexico 
gave no impression of a broad opening in the years to come. 
Nevertheless, Mexico’s energy reforms that were adopted in 
2014 present a dramatic turn of events: they open up the energy 
sector to private investment. One can speculate that if the 
energy reforms had been adopted before the end of the 2012 
Transboundary Agreement negotiations, the provisions in the 
agreement would have been different: at least the fears that the 
U.S. licensee would have to negotiate only with PEMEX would 
have been off the table. It is now up to a Joint Commission, that 
is atypical under international standards, and the governmental 
authorities designated by the States to give life to an 
international instrument that was signed under a different 
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scenario and set of assumptions, and to make it efficient for the 
benefit of both nations. The level of political maturity from both 
sides in designating their representatives, and the level of 
communications between both governments will be essential in 
order to secure an effective regime. For the reasons stated in this 
Article, the regime is complex enough as it is. If politics override 
technological and science-based decisions, the development of 
the regime will be in danger with the risk that both nations will 
lose the chance to benefit from the extraordinary resources of 
the region. 
 
